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INTRODUCTION 
Would you agree to allow your physician to give the state health 
department any of the following information about you personally or 
your children? 
 A contagious disease, such as tuberculosis, gonorrhea, or HIV 
 A chronic disease, such as a cancer, asthma, or lupus 
 Blood sugar levels 
 Prescriptions for controlled substances 
 Immunizations 
 A newborn child’s genetic anomaly 
 The cost of medical care 
 The outcome of medical treatment 
The answer may be “it depends.”  Many people may not care at all 
whether the state has any or all of their medical information.1  For 
others, the answer depends on why the state needs specific infor-
mation and what it does with that information.2  State health and so-
cial service departments routinely collect health information in all 
these categories from physicians, hospitals, laboratories, and pharma-
cies pursuant to various state reporting laws.3  They may also give the 
information, with or without personal identifiers, to federal and in-
ternational agencies and private researchers.  Few of these laws re-
quire individual consent to either the collection or the uses of a per-
son’s information.  Should consent be required for any of these laws?  
What health information should be freely accessible to government 
and what should not? 
These questions arise in the context of competing trends in the 
age of Big Data:  the increasing social and commercial value of health 
information,4 and rising concerns about the loss of privacy in the 
 
 1 See Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Balancing Privacy, Autonomy, and Scientific Needs 
in Electronic Health Records Research, 65 SMU L. REV. 85, 112–14 (2012) (summarizing vary-
ing public opinion poll results); see also Americans Trust Physicians, Not Government, with 
Medical Info, AHC MEDIA (Oct. 1, 1997), http://www.ahcmedia.com/articles/35862-
americans-trust-physicians-not-government-with-medical-info (finding that two-thirds of 
poll respondents would prefer that their physicians and not the government, insurance 
companies, or employers have access to their medical information). 
 2 See infra text accompanying notes 353–55. 
 3 See infra Part II. 
 4 See, e.g., M. Rose Gasner et al., Legal and Policy Barriers to Sharing Data Between Public Health 
Programs in New York City:  A Case Study, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 993, 996–97 (2014) (en-
couraging changes in laws to permit identifiable data sharing among health departments, 
social service programs, health care facilities, and other agencies); Christopher Rees, To-
morrow’s Privacy:  Personal Information as Property, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 220, 220–21 
(2013); Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, Health Research Bill Would Alter HIPAA, GOVINFO 
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wake of Edward Snowden’s revelation of the National Security Agen-
cy’s (“NSA”) bulk data collection.5  Furthermore, recent U.S. Su-
preme Court opinions hint that information held by third parties 
may warrant some Fourth Amendment protection in the rapidly 
evolving age of cloud computing.6  Such judicial hints have encour-
aged critics of the third-party doctrine to argue that the Fourth 
Amendment does not give government entirely free rein to obtain in-
formation about a person simply because the information is in the 
hands of a third party.7  The cases may also inspire a reassessment of 
whether and how other Amendments might protect personal health 
information.8 
 
SECURITY (May 11, 2015), http://www.govinfosecurity.com/health-research-bill-would-
alter-hipaa-a-8214/op-1 (describing privacy concerns about a proposed federal bill, that 
would allow covered entities to use patients’ protected health information for research 
without patient consent). But see The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact 
Sheet:  President Obama’s Precision Medicine Initiative (Jan. 30, 2015), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/30/fact-sheet-president-obama-s-
precision-medicine-initiative (proposing NIH cancer research program with at least a mil-
lion volunteers who contribute their medical records, profiles of genes, metabolites, and 
microorganisms, environmental and lifestyle data, their own patient-generated infor-
mation, and personal device and sensor data). 
 5 See, e.g., PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE 
RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON 
THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 142–43 (Jan. 23, 
2014) (noting NSA’s arguments that bulk data collection allows instantaneous data re-
trieval, comparison with historical records, and breadth of relationships with contacts); 
Spencer Ackerman, Privacy Experts Question Obama’s Plan for New Agency to Counter Cyber 
Threats, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2015), www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/10/
obama-cyber-threat-agency-privacy; Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Pro-
gram Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and Others, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013), 
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data; Edward Snowden, THE 
GUARDIAN, www.theguardian.com/us-news/edward-snowden (last visited Nov. 4, 2015). 
 6 See Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2451 (2015) (finding that a city ordinance re-
quiring hotel operators to maintain hotel guest records for inspection on demand by po-
lice facially violates Fourth Amendment “because it fails to provide hotel operators with 
an opportunity for precompliance review”); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 
(2014) (“Privacy comes at a cost.”); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an in-
dividual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to 
third parties.”); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (asking “what limits 
there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy” un-
der the Fourth Amendment). 
 7 See generally Alan Butler, Get a Warrant:  The Supreme Court’s New Course for Digital Privacy 
Rights After Riley v. California, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 83 (2015) (describing 
Riley’s possible effect on future Supreme Court Fourth Amendment decisions involving 
new technologies). 
 8 For analyses of First Amendment implications, see generally ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR 
PRIVACY:  WHAT MUST WE HIDE (2011); Anita L. Allen, First Amendment Privacy and the Bat-
tle for Progressively Liberal Change, 14 J. CONST. L. 885 (2012); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., 
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This Article encourages that reassessment.  Part I describes the 
types of questions that deserve fresh constitutional analysis.  Part II 
summarizes a variety of purposes for which health information is be-
ing collected and used today.  Part III analyzes the third-party doc-
trine exception to the application of the Fourth Amendment, which 
permits the government to obtain information from a third party 
without the data subject’s consent.  It concludes that, when closely 
analyzed, the relevant third-party doctrine cases do not offer useful 
precedents for evaluating mandatory reporting laws.  The administra-
tive search exception and the special needs exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirement of probable cause or individualized suspi-
cion are examined in Parts IV and V, respectively.  Like the third-
party doctrine examples, these cases offer limited guidance for de-
termining whether government has the power to enact the range of 
mandatory reporting laws contemplated for contemporary civil pur-
poses.  Part VI analyzes Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment protection 
of health information privacy as an aspect of liberty protected by the 
Due Process Clause, again finding only partially applicable precedent. 
Three conclusions are drawn from this review.  The first is that 
traditional interpretations offer meager constitutional protection for 
health information privacy.  A second conclusion is that traditional 
interpretations of constitutional doctrine no longer adequately ac-
count for either the range of expectations of privacy in health infor-
mation or the circumstances in which such information should be 
more or less widely available.9  Third, as argued in Part VII, there is 
room for a more sophisticated approach to constitutional protection 
of health information.  Such an approach should recognize current 
and future dependence on sharing personal information electroni-
cally with public and private entities, as well as the dignitary aspect of 
health information privacy.  It should also move from a blanket, bi-
modal doctrinal model in which the Fourth Amendment, for exam-
ple, does or does not apply, to a more individualized, purpose-
oriented approach, one that increases the level of judicial scrutiny in 
 
Reconciling Privacy and Speech in the Era of Big Data:  A Comparative Legal Analysis, 56 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1279 (2015). 
 9 See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 378–97 (2015) (describ-
ing ways in which uses of data in cyberspace challenge legal doctrines); David G. Delaney, 
Widening the Aperture on Fourth Amendment Interests:  A Comment on Orin Kerr’s The Fourth 
Amendment and the Global Internet, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 12 (May 18, 2015) (ar-
guing that governments should look beyond traditional doctrines derived from law en-
forcement cases to “to establish suitable search-and-seizure frameworks that match socie-
ty’s dependence on cyberspace”). 
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inverse proportion to the immediacy of the need for the information 
to respond to existing threats to health or safety.10 
I.  FRAMING THE QUESTIONS 
Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”)11 and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)12 
recognize privacy as a human right.  Numerous international and re-
gional conventions also contain privacy protections.13  In December 
2013, amid concerns that surveillance adversely affects human rights, 
the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 68/167 
calling on states to protect privacy both offline and online and em-
phasizing that “international human rights law provides the universal 
framework against which any interference in individual privacy rights 
 
 10 For example, Professor Daniel J. Solove recommends abandoning the reasonable expec-
tations of privacy concept in Fourth Amendment doctrine in favor of requiring regula-
tion and oversight “whenever a particular government information gathering activity cre-
ates problems of reasonable significance.”  Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 
51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1514 (2010). 
 11 Adopted and proclaimed by G.A. Res. 217(A) (III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Article 12:  No one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspond-
ence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.  Everyone has the right to the pro-
tection of the law against such interference or attacks.”). 
 12 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by G.A. Res. 2200(A) (XXI) 
(Dec. 16, 1966) (“Article 17:  1.  No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful inter-
ference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks upon 
his honour and reputation.  2.  Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference or attacks.”).  The United States ratified the ICCPR.  United Nations 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (adopted by the United States June 8, 1992). 
 13 See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights, Status of the International Covenants on Human 
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4 (Sept. 28, 1984); Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Action (1993), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993) (adopted by the World 
Conference on Human Rights, June 25, 1993); European Convention on Human Rights 
art. 8, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family 
life, his home and his correspondence.”); Treaty of Lisbon:  Amending the Treaty on Eu-
ropean Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 16B, Dec. 17, 
2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, 51 (“Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data 
concerning them.”); G.A. Res. 45/158 art. 14, Convention on Migrant Workers (Dec. 18, 
1990); G.A. Res. 44/25 art. 16, Convention on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989); 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Art. 10; American Convention on 
Human Rights, Art. 11; Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa, 
Art. 4; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Art. 5; Arab Charter on 
Human Rights, Art. 17; ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Art. 21; European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 8; Johannes-
burg Principles on National Security, Free Expression and Access to Information; Cam-
den Principles on Freedom of Expression and Equality. 
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must be assessed.”14  Pursuant to the Resolution, the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights prepared a report on the right to privacy in 
the digital age.15  The High Commissioner’s Report, The Right to Pri-
vacy in the Digital Age, was requested primarily in response to anti-
terrorism surveillance by the NSA and other nations’ security agen-
cies, but its principles are applicable more generally.16  The High 
Commissioner noted that digital surveillance practices can negatively 
affect other human rights, such as the human right to health, “for ex-
ample where an individual refrains from seeking or communicating 
sensitive health-related information for fear that his or her anonymity 
may be compromised.”17  The Report questions “the extent to which 
consumers are truly aware of what data they are sharing, how and 
with whom, and to what use they will be put.”18 
The Report summarizes basic principles governing the human 
right to privacy.  First, “surveillance measures must not arbitrarily or 
unlawfully interfere with an individual’s privacy, family, home or cor-
respondence.”19  The Human Rights Committee interprets the prohi-
bition against arbitrary or unlawful measures to mean that even laws 
that are properly enacted can be “arbitrary” if they contravene provi-
sions, aims or objectives of the ICCPR or are unreasonable in the par-
ticular circumstances.20  More specifically, to be reasonable and not 
arbitrary, “any interference with privacy must be proportional to the 
end sought and be necessary in the circumstances of any given 
case.”21  To be necessary, an intrusion on privacy must be “the least 
intrusive option available.”22  These three concepts—legality, necessi-
ty, and proportionality—form the core principles of privacy protec-
tion in the human rights framework.  They can be seen in many in-
 
 14 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Right to Privacy 
in the Digital Age, at para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/37 (June 30, 2014) [hereinafter 
OHCHR, Right to Privacy]; see also G.A. Res. 68/167, The Right to Privacy in the Digital 
Age (Dec. 18, 2013). 
 15 G.A. Res. 68/167, supra note 14, at 3. 
 16 OHCHR, Right to Privacy, supra note 14, at para. 3.  The Report was presented to the 
U.N. General Assembly on September 14, 2014, and the General Assembly is to follow it 
up in the future. 
 17 Id. at para. 14. 
 18 Id. at para. 18. 
 19 Id. at para. 15. 
 20 Id. at para. 21; see also Human Rights Committee, General Comment 16 (Twenty-third ses-
sion, 1988), COMPILATION OF GENERAL COMMENTS AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
ADOPTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 21 (1994), 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&Tre
atyID=8&DocTypeID=11. 
 21 OHCHR, Right to Privacy, supra note 14, at para. 21. 
 22 Id. at para. 23. 
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ternational and regional documents, the European Data Directive, 
and in the various versions of Fair Information Practices principles.23  
These and other guidelines limit both public and private data collec-
tion to the minimum necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose.24 
The United States Supreme Court is not in the habit of relying on 
international conventions to interpret constitutional provisions.25  
Nonetheless, one might hear echoes of these principles in Chief Jus-
tice John Roberts’ approach to evaluating whether police need a war-
rant to search the cell phone contents of an arrestee in Riley v. Cali-
fornia:  “by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes 
upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it 
is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”26  
Ira Rubenstein notes that Big Data “challenges international privacy 
laws in several ways:  it casts doubt on the distinction between person-
al and non-personal data, clashes with data minimization, and un-
dermines informed choice.”27  As the Supreme Court is beginning to 
recognize, Big Data challenges U.S. laws on privacy in the same ways. 
Health information offers a paradigmatic candidate for exploring 
whether and when U.S. constitutional law should protect privacy.  In-
formation about a person’s health can be viewed as intensely person-
al and private, access to which the person has a moral and perhaps 
legal right to control.28  It can also be viewed as a valuable commodity 
that society needs in order to identify criminal suspects, investigate 
 
 23 See Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices:  A Basic History 3–8, 12–25 (Feb. 11, 2015), 
http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf. 
 24 See Maria Tzanou, Data Protection as a Fundamental Right Next to Privacy?  ‘Reconstructing’ a 
Not So New Right, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 88, 90 (2013) (distinguishing data protection 
and data privacy under the Lisbon Treaty); International Principles on the Application of Hu-
man Rights to Communications Surveillance, NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE (May 2014),  
https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text. 
 25 See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy:  Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE 
L.J. 1151, 1155–57, 1159–60 (2004) (explaining differences in EU and U.S. privacy law). 
 26 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 
295, 300 (1999)). 
 27 Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data:  The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 
74, 74 (2013). 
 28 See, e.g., EDWARD J. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRIVACY 18 (1978); JUDITH 
WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY:  LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 1–2 
(1997); JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 3–4 (1992); Edward J. 
Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity:  An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 962, 979 (1964); Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy:  Moral Ideas in the 
Constitution?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 454 (1983); Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autono-
my, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1423–24 (1974); James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value 
in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 34, 54–5 (2003); Tzanou, supra note 24, at 92, 
97; Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195–
97 (1890). 
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epidemics, calculate budgets, monitor the quality of care, develop so-
cial policy, and conduct biomedical and behavioral research.29  Con-
ceptualizing the meaning of privacy of medical and health infor-
mation is nearly as fraught as conceptualizing the meaning of privacy 
itself, and this article will not attempt to resolve an ultimate mean-
ing.30  Rather, the question explored here is whether the U.S. Consti-
tution may impose any limits on state-compelled collection or use of 
identifiable personal health information for civil—non-law enforce-
ment—purposes, and if so, when and why.  Broad limits may impede 
important social advances.  However, if health information is not pro-
tected at all, can there be protection for other types of information?31 
When courts and scholars offer examples of matters that self-
evidently deserve privacy protection, medical information is a prime 
example.32  In the United States, however, information privacy in 
general and health information privacy in particular is subject to a 
fragmented collection of federal and state laws.33  As Professor Nico-
las P. Terry notes, discussions of health information privacy often 
 
 29 See Nicolas P. Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 81 UMKC L. REV. 385, 
392 (2012) (noting that health data is seen “as a major source of big data”). 
 30 For a lucid summary and critique of general theories of privacy, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, 
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008).  Thoughtful scholarly treatments of theories of privacy 
include AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (1999); ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT 
ON PRIVACY (1971); DAVID J. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1978); 
ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 
493 (1968); Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 245, 248 
(2008); Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087 (2001). 
 31 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH:  THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 195–217 (Alan 
Sheridan trans.) (1977) (arguing that governments sought to control people by placing 
under surveillance to encourage conformity with social norms); Jack M. Balkin, The Con-
stitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 17 (2008) (“The more power 
the state amasses, the more Americans need constitutional guarantees to keep govern-
ments honest and devoted to the public good.”). 
 32 See e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(“There can be no question that an employee’s medical records, which may contain inti-
mate facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy 
protection.”); SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 14 (“[I]f a conception of privacy were to omit 
things we commonly view as private—such as medical information, intimate marital se-
crets, and freedom from surveillance—theorists would likely reject the conception.”); 
Terry, supra note 29, at 386 (“[H]ealth information technologies (‘HIT’) and patient pri-
vacy share a long history of bipartisan support.”); Electronic Health Data Exchanges:  Patient 
and Consumer Principles for System Design, MARKLE FOUNDATION (Oct. 11, 2005), http: / /
www.markle.org/publications/878-electronic-health-data-exchanges-patient-and-
consumer-principles-system-design (reporting wide support for patients to be able to re-
fuse to share their health information).  The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(6) (2012),  speci fically  exempts  medical fi les  from disclosure. 
 33 See WENDY K. MARINER & GEORGE J. ANNAS, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 398–401 (2014) (explain-
ing various groundings for privacy rights); Ira S. Rubinstein et al., Systematic Government 
Access to Personal Data:  A Comparative Analysis, 4 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 96, 96–97 (2014). 
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conflate privacy protection with preserving the confidentiality of in-
formation already obtained, with or without a person’s permission.34 
Calls for mandatory reporting of more health information, for ex-
ample, typically contain the puzzling caveat that its collection and use 
should, of course, safeguard privacy.35  There are, however, two sepa-
rate issues here.  The threshold question is whether identifiable data 
should be collected without consent in the first place.  If not, its col-
lection is an invasion of privacy.36  The second is whether data that is 
properly obtained will be kept confidential—that is, not disclosed to 
others by the recipient.  Discussions of mandatory reporting laws of-
ten proceed directly to the second question, skipping over the first.37  
Typically, the first question is waved away on the basis of a presump-
tion that the state is free to compel reporting as long as it serves at 
least a legitimate state interest.38  Thus, the concept of privacy is 
stripped of its normative force, leaving only procedural questions 
about whether and how to keep the reported information confiden-
tial—secure against further disclosure to unauthorized persons or the 
public at large.39 
This focus on confidentiality or public disclosure also fails to ask a 
third or fourth question:  whether the data should be used by the re-
cipient for a different purpose than the one that justified its collec-
tion; or whether the recipient should be able to give the information 
 
 34 See Nicolas P. Terry, What’s Wrong with Health Privacy?, 5 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 5–
8, 23–26 (2009). 
 35 Such comments are rarely accompanied by specific recommendations for privacy protec-
tion.  See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON THE RECOMMENDED SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL DOMAINS AND 
MEASURES FOR ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS, CAPTURING SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL 
DOMAINS AND MEASURES IN ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS:  PHASE 2, at 13 (2014). 
 36 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-E (AM. LAW. INST. 1977); see also id. 
§ 652A(2) (“The right of privacy is invaded by:  (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the se-
clusion of another, as stated in § 652B; or (b) appropriation of the other’s name or like-
ness, as stated in § 652C; or (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life, as 
stated in § 652D; or (d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before 
the public, as stated in § 652E.”). 
 37 See, e.g., AMY L. FAIRCHILD ET AL., SEARCHING EYES:  PRIVACY, THE STATE, AND DISEASE 
SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 1 (2007). 
 38 See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 606 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring).  Some courts 
have used heightened scrutiny to require an important or even compelling state interest 
when the information at issue is especially sensitive, such as HIV infection or abortion.  
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60–61 (1976); Sheets 
v. Salt Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383, 1388–89 (10th Cir. 1995); Walls v. City of Petersburg, 
895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990); Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 812 
F.2d 105, 110, 112–13 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 39 See, e.g., The White House, Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015 [hereinafter Con-
sumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act], www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
legislative/letters/cpbr-act-of-2015-discussion-draft.pdf. 
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to third parties for new uses.  Thus, there are at least four issues that 
deserve exploration:  (1) the justification for the initial mandatory 
data collection; (2) security against further disclosure of the data 
(confidentiality); (3) permissible uses of the data collected; and (4) 
permissible disclosures of the data to third parties.  The failure to dis-
tinguish these questions contributes to a lack of clarity surrounding 
what information warrants what, if any, kind of privacy protection. 
This Article asks the first question:  what kinds of information 
should government agencies be free to compel from third parties 
who hold an individual’s personal health information?  In other 
words, what counts as a justifiable intrusion on privacy?  This is a 
question of constitutional power. 
At first glance, the idea that mandatory reporting of health infor-
mation might violate any constitutionally protected privacy interest or 
constitute an unreasonable search and seizure seems like an outdated 
notion.  Judging from the volumes of articles on the topic, however, 
the question of the privacy of health-related information is not entire-
ly settled.  Yet the literature focuses on statutory and regulatory re-
gimes, especially the HIPAA Privacy Rule.40  The constitutional di-
mensions of health information privacy in the civil context have 
received little recent attention.41 
 
 40 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”):  Standards for Privacy of 
Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45 C.F.R. § 164 (1996).  See also Beverly Co-
hen, Regulating Data Mining Post-Sorrell:  Using HIPAA to Restrict Marketing Uses of Patients’ 
Private Medical Information, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1141, 1142 (2012); Frank Pasquale, 
Grand Bargains for Big Data:  The Emerging Law of Health Information, 72 MD. L. REV. 682, 
747–51 (2013); Frank Pasquale & Tara Adams Ragone, Protecting Health Privacy in an Era of 
Big Data Processing and Cloud Computing, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 595, 597, 608 (2014); 
Mark A. Rothstein, HIPAA Privacy Rule 2.0, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 525, 525 (2013); Lior 
Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2010, 2021 
(2013) (focusing on the positive law of privacy and empirical analyses of who wins and 
who loses).  But see Mark A. Rothstein, Constitutional Right to Informational Health Privacy in 
Critical Condition, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 280, 280–81 (2011) (describing due process chal-
lenges to demands for personal health information). 
 41 The focus of constitutional analysis has been NSA surveillance and law enforcement 
searches and seizures.  See generally LORI ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT 
YOU DID:  SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE DEATH OF PRIVACY (2011); JAMES P. NEHF, OPEN 
BOOK:  THE FAILED PROMISE OF INFORMATION PRIVACY IN AMERICA (2012); ROBERT 
O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE (2005); FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY:  
THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015); JEFFREY 
ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE:  THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA (2000); 
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK:  THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2008); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON:  TECHNOLOGY 
AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE:  THE 
FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY (2011). 
Feb. 2016] HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY 985 
 
Several indicators suggest that now is an opportune time to revisit 
the parameters of constitutional protection for health information.  
First, with a financial push from the federal government, health in-
formation is being digitized at an increasing rate, while private sector 
internet services allow individuals to upload and monitor their own 
health information via multiple devices.42  All this feeds into Big Data, 
where predictive analytics can be used to identify higher quality, less 
costly health care and target individuals or groups for preventive or 
remedial interventions.43 
Second, the excitement over Big Data’s potential to improve our 
lives is tempered by concerns that information can be misused to the 
detriment of many people, especially the disadvantaged.44  In this era, 
government agencies, including law enforcement and national secu-
rity, can often obtain data collected by private entities.45  Acknowledg-
 
 42 The HITECH Act provides financial incentives for medical providers to adopt electronic 
medical records and permit data sharing.  Health Information Technology for Economic 
and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111–5, 123 Stat. 226, 226–27, 230 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also THE OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL 
COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
HEALTH INFORMATION BLOCKING, at 4 (Apr. 2015), http:/ /www.healthit.gov/
sites/default/files/reports/info_blocking_040915.pdf; Health Datapalooza 2015 Continues 
to Focus on Access to Health Data, HIMMS NEWS (June 5, 2015), 
http://www.himss.org/News/NewsDetail.aspx?ItemNumber=42579; Priyanka Dayal 
McCluskey, Partners’ $1.2b Patient Data System Seen as Key to Future, THE BOSTON GLOBE 
(June 1, 2015), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/05/31/partners-launches-
billion-electronic-health-records-system/oo4nJJW2rQyfWUWQlvydkK/story.html. 
 43 See Terry, supra note 29, at 723–24, 749–50; see also Stephen Blakely, Measured Matters:  The 
Use of “Big Data” in Employee Benefits,  NOTES, April 2015, at 11–12, 18 (describing analyses 
of employee health data by employers and health insurers); Girish Navani, How Big Data 
is Driving the Consumerization of Health Care, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 14, 2015), 
http://health.usnews.com/health-news/patient-advice/articles/2015/08/14/how-big-
data-is-driving-the-consumerization-of-health-care (describing how wearable technology 
can be linked to medical records to improve patient care). 
 44 See JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE? (2013) (describing the concentration of 
power among entities that control the collection and analysis of information); Frank 
Pasquale, Resdescribing Health Privacy:  The Importance of Information Policy, 14 HOUS. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 95, 96–97 (2014) (describing potential discriminatory misuses of in-
formation).  See also Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 12 (2008) (arguing that government is more likely to use surveillance to 
shape population behavior); Wendy K. Mariner, The Affordable Care Act and Health Promo-
tion:  The Role of Insurance in Defining Responsibility for Health Risks and Costs, 50 DUQ. L. 
REV. 271, 310–11 (2012) (describing the use of health information for wellness program 
rewards and penalties). 
 45 See Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309, 1320–21 
(2012) (“The FBI and other law enforcement agencies will shift from being active pro-
ducers of surveillance to passive consumers, essentially outsourcing all of their surveil-
lance activities to private third parties, ones who are not only ungoverned by the state ac-
tion requirements of the Fourth Amendment, but also who have honed the ability to 
convince private citizens to agree to be watched.”); see also Balkin, supra note 44, at 7 
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ing such concerns, the Obama Administration proposed new statuto-
ry and regulatory measures to protect the privacy of data held by pri-
vate data custodians, intensifying debate on the extent to which indi-
viduals should be able to control access to their personal infor-
information.46  Moreover, members of Congress recently curbed the 
NSA’s bulk data collection and other federal surveillance practices in 
order to limit privacy intrusions.47  Most importantly, the Supreme 
Court’s recent Fourth Amendment decisions suggest that a majority 
of Justices may be considering a more sophisticated approach to de-
termining when government agencies can access digital data. 
II.  USES OF HEALTH INFORMATION 
Health information is a valuable commodity.  Properly collected 
and analyzed, it has the potential to provide insights into better quali-
ty, more efficient, and less costly health services.48  It may also enable 
 
(“[T]he line between public and private modes of surveillance and security has blurred if 
not vanished. Public and private enterprises are thoroughly intertwined.”); Amitai 
Etzioni, The Privacy Merchants:  What Is To Be Done?, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 929, 951 (2012) 
(“[O]ne must assume that what is private is also public in two senses of these words:  that 
one’s privacy (including sensitive matters) is rapidly corroded by the private sector and 
that whatever it learns is also available to the government.”); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dos-
siers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1095 (2002) 
(“[G]overnment is increasingly contracting with private sector entities to acquire data-
bases of personal information.”). 
 46 See Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act, supra note 39; see also President’s Council of Advi-
sors on Science and Technology, Big Data and Privacy: A Technological Perspective (May 
2014), www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_big_
data_and_privacy_-_may_2014.pdf; Federal Trade Commission, Data Brokers:  A Call for 
Transparency and Accountability (May 2014), www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-
may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf; Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumer 
Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for Businesses and Policymakers (March 
2012), www.ftc.gov/reports/protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-
recommendations-businesses-policymakers; The White House, Consumer Data Privacy in a 
Networked World: A Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Dig-
ital Economy (Feb. 2012), www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf.  The 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid excised information concerning substance abuse 
from the claims records it opens to researchers.  See Austin B. Frakt & Nicholas Bagley, 
Protection or Harm?  Suppressing Substance-Use Data, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1879, 1879 (2015) 
(arguing that researchers’ lack of access to these files, representing about 4.5% of Medi-
care claims and 8% of Medicaid claims, will impede a wide range of research). 
 47 On June 2, 2015, Congress passed and the President signed the Uniting and Strengthen-
ing America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 
2015, H.R. 2048, 114th Cong. § 201 (2015). 
 48 See, e.g., Pasquale & Ragone, supra note 40, at 598; see also David W. Bates et al., Big Data in 
Health Care: Using Analytics to Identify and Manage High-Risk and High-Cost Patients, 33 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 1123, 1123 (2014); Matthew Herland, Taghi M. Khoshgoftaar & Randall 
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individuals to access information about health concerns and the costs 
of care.  Health informatics specialists suggest that achieving such 
goals is likely to entail integrating and analyzing data from different 
sources, such as medical records, gene banks, disease registries, pub-
lic health databases, and social media to study both clinical and policy 
questions.49  One might add to that list the data collected by commer-
cial entities from individuals using wearable technologies like Fitbit to 
monitor distances walked, calories consumed, and the like.50  The 
value of the results of such data mining and analysis, of course, de-
pends importantly on the reliability and accuracy of the information 
contained in the source data sets.51  However, the current state of 
technology is not immune from introducing new errors in the pro-
cess of mining, integrating, and analyzing data.52 
A.  Clinical Medical Care, Payment for Services, and Health Care Operations 
The original and still most common functions of electronic medi-
cal records (“EMR”)—or electronic health records (“EHR”), the cur-
rent, broader term—are (1) to make patient information available to 
clinicians and health care workers as needed to provide care to the 
patient,53 and (2) to facilitate the submission and payment of provid-
er claims for treatment services.54  No one disputes the need for shar-
ing identifiable patient information for these purposes, although 
there are some concerns that the shared information be limited to 
 
Wald, A Review of Data Mining Using Big Data in Health Informatics,  J. BIG DATA, June 2014, 
at 22; Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Improving Health Care Outcomes Through Per-
sonalized Comparisons of Treatment Effectiveness Based on Electronic Health Records, 39 J.L. MED. 
& ETHICS 425, 425 (2011). 
 49 Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 48, at 428; see also Nigam H. Shah& Jessica D. 
Tenenbaum, The Coming Age of Data-Driven Medicine:  Translational Bioinformatics’ Next Fron-
tier, 19 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N e1, e3 (2012). 
 50 Angela Daley, The Law and Ethics of ‘Self-Quantified’ Health Information:  An Australian Per-
spective, 5 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 144 (2015) (describing such devices and their uses). 
 51 See Sharona Hoffman, Medical Big Data and Big Data Quality Problems, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 
289, 290, 304 (2015); see also Simon I. Hay, Dylan B. George, Catherine L. Moyes & John 
S. Brownstein, Big Data Opportunities for Global Infectious Disease Surveillance, PLOS MED., 
Apr. 2013, at 2–3 (noting that data from social media can be unreliable or misleading). 
 52 Thomson Kuhn et al., Clinical Documentation in the 21st Century:  Executive Summary of a Pol-
icy Position Paper From the American College of Physicians, 162 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 301, 
308 (2015).  See generally K. Krasnow Waterman & Paula J. Bruening, Big Data Analytics:  
Risks and Responsibilities, 4 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 89, 89–90 (2014). 
 53 Kuhn et al., supra note 52, at 302, 310. 
 54 The “treatment” and “payment” uses are permitted without patient authorization under 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule as part of “treatment, payment or health care operations.” 45 
C.F.R. § 164.506 (2002). 
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only that necessary for the recipient to perform a specific function.55  
Most large hospital systems and large physician group practices have 
implemented EHRs, but adoption by smaller providers has been 
slow.56  A lack of interoperability among EHR systems has hindered 
progress toward statewide, regional, and national networks.57  None-
theless, EHRs are expected to become the source of data for an in-
creasing number of purposes as technology improves.58 
Hospitals and other health care facilities, as well as physician prac-
tice groups, typically review EHR data to analyze the cost and quality 
of care they have provided to their patients.  Such review can focus 
on a single patient—to identify an error in diagnosis, treatment or 
follow-up—or on a group of patients to determine whether a particu-
lar course of treatment has proved effective.59  Where the analyses are 
designed to provide generalizable knowledge to improve patient care 
in general, rather than to inform the reviewers’ own practices, they 
could be considered health services research that requires patient 
consent under state law.60 
B.  State Databases 
States have developed several databases of identifiable health in-
formation for both clinical and research uses.  The Federal Govern-
ment encourages states to create Prescription Drug Monitoring Pro-
 
 55 For a history and comparison of different versions of Fair Information Practices, see 
Gellman, supra note 23. 
 56 See Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Electronic 
Health Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 681, 686 (2007). 
 57 See id. at 682. 
 58 See Caitlin M. Cusack et al., The Future State of Clinical Data Capture and Documentation:  A 
Report from AMIA’s 2011 Policy Meeting, 20 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N. 134 (2013).  But 
see Jennifer Bresnick, Health Information Exchange Data Scarce, Inaccurate, Incomplete, 
HEALTH IT ANALYTICS (Feb. 17, 2015), http://healthitanalytics.com/news/health-
information-exchange-data-scarce-inaccurate-incomplete (“Due to the perception of 
health information exchange as unpredictable, inaccurate, incomplete, and expensive, 
70% of non-system hospitals and 91% of physician practices are not routinely communi-
cating patient data to external organizations.”). 
 59 Such reviews are encompassed under the “health care operations” uses permitted without 
patient authorization under the HIPAA Privacy Rule. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a), 45 C.F.R. 
§ 164.506. 
 60 But cf. J. Cassel & A. Young, Why We Should Not Seek Individual Informed Consent For Participa-
tion In Health Services Research, 28 J. MED. ETHICS 313, 316 (2002) (“A right to individual 
informed consent, interpreted as an absolute requirement in all areas of research, mili-
tates against health care for disadvantaged minorities, since some groups will have the no-
tional ‘right’ to health care but are not in a position to exert that right equally.”). 
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grams (“PDMPs”) in an effort to reduce prescription drug abuse.61  
Physicians can consult an electronic database of prescription drugs 
dispensed to individuals to determine whether a patient has a legiti-
mate medical need for the drug.  PDMPs, especially those that allow 
law enforcement or other government agencies access to the data, 
raise Fourth Amendment questions, discussed in Part V. 
The need to control health care costs generated proposals for 
states to collect health insurance claims data, to analyze the cost of 
different types of health care services and items.62  At least sixteen 
states have enacted legislation requiring health insurance companies 
to submit reports of their payments on behalf of enrollees to the state 
department of health or insurance or a special agency created to col-
lect such reports in an All Payer Data Base (“APDB”), sometimes 
called an All Payer Claims Database (“APCD”).63 
More states are proposing or developing APDBs.  Individuals 
whose data are reported are not asked for consent and may not even 
realize that their data is being sent to the state.64  Most states out-
source the operation of the APDB to an outside vendor.65 
An additional stated goal of APDBs is to determine the quality of 
different approaches to care for medical conditions, but quality has 
been subordinated to cost concerns so far, perhaps because reliable 
measures of quality remain limited.  To analyze quality, states may 
need to track the care provided on an individualized basis in order to 
 
 61 See generally Kristin M. Finklea et al., Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress R42593 (Jan. 3, 2013). 
 62 See Jo Porter et al., The Basics of All-Payer Claims Databases:  A Primer for States, STATE 
HEALTH AND VALUE STRATEGIES (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.rwjf.org/en/research-
publications/find-rwjf-research/2014/01/the-basics-of-all-payer-claims-databases—a-
primer-for-states.html. 
 63 If truly all payers are included, then Medicare and Veterans Affairs health services, as well 
as other federal health benefit programs, need to agree to submit their claims for bene-
fits.  The Federal Government has been reasonably willing to participate, given its interest 
in finding ways to control health care costs.  See MD. HEALTH CARE COMM’N & CTR. FOR 
ANALYSIS AND INFO. SERVS., Draft Work Plan for Expanding the Content and Use of Maryland’s 
Medical Care Data Base (MCDB) to Address New Information Needs, at 2 (June 2013), 
http://mhcc.maryland.gov/mhcc/pages/apcd/apcd_mcdb/documents/MCDB_Draft_
Workplan_20130601.pdf. (describing the history and operation of the Maryland Medical 
Care Data Base).  Third party administrators (“TPAs”) of self-funded employer-sponsored 
health plans governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) pre-
sent a different problem.  See Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016) 
(finding that ERISA preempts Vermont state requirement that ERISA plans or their TPAs 
report claims). 
 64 Most health insurance policies include a standard provision that the policyholder agrees 
to allow the insurer to use and disclose the person’s information for multiple purposes, 
with some explicitly including research.  Sample policies are on file with author. 
 65 See Porter et al., supra note 62. 
990 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 18:3 
 
attribute outcomes to specific provider interventions.  They may also 
wish to observe cost of care trends associated with particular patients 
or providers to impute rises or falls in cost (accounting for volume), 
with or without comparing the quality of the care provided.  Both us-
es typically require tracking individual patients and which individual 
practitioners provided what type of care. 
A major motivating idea behind APDBs is that states will be able to 
provide consumers with price information about particular health 
services, thereby enabling consumers to choose the most cost-
effective health plans and providers.  So far, however, the data has 
been used primarily for research, by the agencies and outside re-
search organizations like universities and consulting firms, with lim-
ited information open to consumers.66  There is considerable enthu-
siasm for APDBs among research organizations, which advocate 
making greater use of the data for multiple research purposes.67  Pro-
posals include linking the APDB to other databases, such as medical 
records, disease registries, vital statistics, and patient surveys. 
There is no question that it would be useful to be able to identify 
what types of medical care work well and which do not—and at what 
price—both to improve patient care and to avoid wasting money.  Do-
ing so often requires following identifiable patients as they go from 
provider to provider.  Indeed, supporters of APDBs advocate releas-
ing identifiable data sets to providers and others for such purposes. 
Databases invite data mining.68  The appeal of analyzing infor-
mation already collected is almost irresistible.  If one searches hard 
enough, something will certainly be found.  Thus, the mere existence 
of a database attracts new users and uses.  Some of these uses may be 
 
 66 See D.J. Wilson, New APCD Legislation Getting Broad Support, STATE OF REFORM (Jan. 30, 
2015), http://stateofreform.com/news/industry/healthcare-providers/2015/01/new-
apcd-legislation-getting-broad-support/ (“One of the key talking points from supporters 
last year was that providing information options for consumers would help drive account-
ability and price reductions in the market.  The new legislation makes the use of the data 
primarily for research purposes by academic institutions rather than for individuals in 
their health care decision making.”). 
 67 See, e.g., The Network for Excellence in Health Innovation (“NEHI”), All Payer Claims Da-
tabases:  Unlocking the Potential (Dec. 2014), http://www.nehi.net/publications/62-all-
payer-claims-databases-unlocking-the-potential/view (“Experts agreed that it was unlikely 
for APCDs to become the go-to resource for consumer price/cost transparency infor-
mation.”).  NEHI’s board of directors consists of executives of health insurance compa-
nies, academic medical centers, and commercial businesses. 
 68 See generally SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION:  THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY (Deborah Russell ed., 1st ed. 2000); ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 
(2005). 
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benign, but others may not be so benign.69  New users develop a stake 
in the database.  If any serious objection arises, these stakeholders of-
ten are too entrenched to support any limitation on data collection 
or uses.70 
C.  Public Health Surveillance 
Much of the public, including privacy scholars and judges, proba-
bly are unfamiliar with modern public health surveillance programs, 
perhaps assuming that such programs are limited to serious epidem-
ics of contagious disease, like Ebola or avian flu.71  To be sure, all 
states have laws that require medical facilities, physicians, and labora-
tories to report diagnoses of contagious diseases that could pose a 
risk of infecting the public.  The list of diseases and conditions that 
the Centers for Disease Prevention and Control recommend be re-
ported has grown to sixty-nine, although not all states require all to 
be reported.72  In the case of disease outbreaks, like the recent mea-
sles outbreaks, the reports help trace the cases to their source and 
health practitioners can intervene to stop the spread of disease. 
Investigating outbreaks and epidemics, however, is a declining 
part of public health surveillance today.73  Public health now focuses 
special attention on chronic diseases.74  Many states require the re-
porting of individuals with non-infectious chronic diseases like asth-
ma, multiple sclerosis, and lupus, in order to study whether they 
might be caused by environmental risks.75  Most states also have regis-
 
 69 See, e.g., Aid for Women v. Foulston, 427 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (D. Kan. 2006) (rejecting state 
Attorney General’s opinion that sexual abuse reporting statute required medical provid-
ers to report consensual sexual activity of minors to the state). 
 70 MARINER & ANNAS, supra note 33, at 432. 
 71 See, e.g., Deven McGraw, Privacy Concerns Related to Inclusion of Social and Behavioral 
Determinants of Health in Electronic Medical Records, Appendix B, in IOM Report 
(summarizing HIPAA’s public health exception without describing what counts as public 
health). 
 72 See Centers for Disease Prevention and Control (“CDC”), 2014 National Notifiable Infec-
tious Diseases, http: / / wwwn.cdc.gov/NNDSS/script/ConditionList.aspx? Type=0&Yr=
2014.  Recommendations are developed by the CDC and the Council of State and Terri-
torial Epidemiologists, a professional membership association of state and local epidemi-
ologists.  The National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System at the CDC collects disease 
reports that are voluntarily submitted by the states.  For a history of disease surveillance, 
see generally FAIRCHILD ET AL, supra note 37. 
 73 Wendy K. Mariner, Mission Creep:  Public Health Surveillance and Medical Privacy, 87 B.U. L. 
REV. 347, 350 (2007). 
 74 World Health Organization, Preventing Chronic Diseases—A Vital Investment, at 2 
(2005), http://www.who.int/chp/chronic_disease_report/contents/en/. 
 75 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-206(f) (2014) (requiring schools to report the number of 
students with diagnosed Asthma cases, “(1) at the time of public school enrollment, (2) 
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tries that collect identifiable information about persons with various 
conditions, such as cancers, as well as immunization registries to 
identify children who have not received all the recommended vac-
cines.76  All states require newborns to be screened for between six 
and thirty-one genetic and congenital conditions; two states allow 
parents to refuse the tests.77  Most experts agree that screening is im-
portant for at least six of these conditions, including PKU and sickle 
cell, because some form of treatment is available to prevent or ame-
liorate the condition if begun in infancy.78  The blood test samples 
and results for other conditions are retained for varying lengths of 
time in what amounts to a DNA bank and are used predominantly for 
research.79  In 2014, however, federal legislation recognized that stud-
ies using newborn blood samples collected in newborn screening 
programs must comply with federal regulations governing research 
with human subjects, including obtaining consent for research uses.80 
A more controversial example of chronic disease surveillance is 
New York City’s Blood Sugar Registry.  The City’s Board of Health 
ordinance requires laboratories to report the results of every Hemo-
globin A1c (blood sugar) test to the department of Health and Men-
 
in grade six or seven, and (3) in grade ten or eleven”); MD. CODE REGS. 11.17.03.02 
(mandating licensees to report defined medical conditions including multiple sclerosis to 
the Motor Vehicle Administration).  Other reporting statutes may be invoked for a lim-
ited time period and geographic area.  See MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH CTR. FOR ENVT’L 
EPIDEMIOLOGY PROGRAM, FINAL REPORT ON THE INCIDENCE AND PREVALENCE OF SYSTEMIC 
LUPUS ERYTHEMATOSUS (“SLE”) IN BOSTON AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 3–8, (2007), 
http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/dph/environmental/tracking/lupus-report-web.pdf 
(referring to data collected from in-patient and out-patient records from eleven major 
hospitals in the Metro-Boston catchment area that were obtained by requests pursuant 
statutory authority). 
 76 See National Program of Cancer Registries, 42 U.S.C. § 280e (2002) (authorizing the CDC 
to provide grants for creating cancer registries to states that have certain laws in place); 
IND. CODE § 16-38-2 (2004), https://iga.in.gov/legislative/laws/2014/ic/titles/016/ (es-
tablishing a cancer registry that is open for research purposes without consent unless the 
researcher seeks additional information in which case they must obtain the consent of the 
patient’s attending physician and the written consent of the patient). 
 77 For specific screening requirements in each state, see About Newborn Screen-
ing/Conditions Screened by State, www.babysfirsttest.org/newborn-screening/states. 
 78 See STEFAN TIMMERMANS & MARA BUCHBINDER, SAVING BABIES:  THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
NEWBORN GENETIC SCREENING (2013) (describing how newborn screening is done in 
practice); see also Leila Barraza & Lauren Burkhart, The Expansion of Newborn Screening:  
Implications for Public Health and Policy, 23 ANNALS HEALTH L. 42, 45–46 (2014). 
 79 See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN USING RESIDUAL 
NEWBORN SCREENING SAMPLES FOR TRANSLATIONAL RESEARCH 51–54 (Steve Olson & Ad-
am C. Berger, Rapporteurs 2010). 
 80 Newborn Screening Saves Lives Reauthorization Act of 2014, 42 U.S.C. § 300b-12 
(amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 300b-1 et. seq.) 
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tal Hygiene by name without patient consent.81  The department 
seeks the reports to identify individuals and ensure that they receive 
treatment for diabetes and behavioral education, although the indi-
viduals may already be under a physician’s care, and the department 
cannot compel anyone to accept assistance.82 
D.  Research 
The reader may have noticed a recurring theme in the above ex-
amples.  A striking proportion of the uses of medical information col-
lected is for research.  Indeed, medical databases offer a cheaper al-
ternative to conducting research studies with actual human beings.83  
That research ranges from biomedical and epidemiological studies by 
academic institutions to qualitative research on behavioral risks to 
health, such as tobacco and alcohol use, weight, substance abuse, and 
depression.84  The data are also studied to develop government agen-
cy budgets, employment and other social policies, and whether to re-
quire more reporting.85 
Many organizations encourage the collection and use of more 
health data electronically for multiple purposes, including research.86  
The Institute of Medicine recommended that research using health 
 
 81 New York City, N.Y., 24 Health Code §§ 13.03–04 (2006).  For a description and critique 
of the Registry, see generally Wendy K. Mariner, Medicine and Public Health:  Crossing Legal 
Boundaries, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 121 (2007). 
 82 Shadi Chamany et al., Tracking Diabetes:  New York City’s A1C Registry, 87(3) THE MILBANK 
QTRLY. 547, 559 (2009).  Note that the registry does not track diabetes; it only requires 
reporting of blood sugar levels, one of several measures used to diagnose diabetes.  Mari-
ner, supra note 81, at 123. 
 83 Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1623, 1631–32 
(2013). 
 84 See generally J.R. Lumpkin, History and Significance of Information Systems and Public Health, in 
PUBLIC HEALTH INFORMATICS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 16–38 (P.W. O’Carroll, W.A. 
Yasnoff, M.E. Ward, L.H. Ripp, & E.L. Martin, eds. 2003). 
 85 See Leslie P. Francis, Patient Registries:  Patient Consent When Patients Become Adults, 7 ST. 
LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 389 (2014); A. Nosek et al., Promoting an Open Research Cul-
ture, 348 (6242) SCIENCE 1422 (2015) (advocating increased sharing of datasets for re-
search). 
 86 See, e.g., Committee on the Recommended Social and Behavioral Domains and Measures 
for Electronic Health Records, Institute of Medicine, Capturing Social and Behavioral Do-
mains and Measures in Electronic Health Records:  Phase 2, at 5 (2014); Kuhn, supra note 52, at 
7 (“The laudable goal is to be able to extract data automatically from patient records, 
compile the data into reports, and export them with the click of a button.  This process, if 
it worked well, would be far better than the current process of manual chart abstraction; 
additional data entry at the point of care; and dependency on claims data for measure-
ment of quality, public health reporting, research, and regulatory compliance.”); 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Transforming Healthcare Through Secondary Use of Health Data 
(2009), www.pwc.com/us/en/healthcare/publications/secondary-health.data.jhtml. 
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information should be permitted without the individual’s consent.87  
That recommendation, criticized by some legal scholars, has not 
gained noticeable support outside the research community.88  A re-
cent report recommends that electronic health records include more 
information about a patient’s social and behavioral issues to “enable 
more effective responses to the pressures [affecting health] when 
used by health systems, including public health officials, researchers, 
and providers treating individual patients.”89  Among the elements 
recommended to be noted in the medical record were stress, negative 
affect such as depression or anxiety, physical activity, alcohol use, ex-
posure to partner violence, and socioeconomic characteristics, in-
cluding neighborhood median household income.90 
The commercial and research value of large databases of identifi-
able information can attract external threats to privacy.  Health in-
formation appears to be surprisingly vulnerable to hacking, theft, and 
loss.91  The Department of Health and Human Services posts reports 
of breaches of more than 500 medical records since 2009, required 
pursuant to the HITECH Act.92  The site listed more than 1,000 
 
 87 BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE:  ENHANCING PRIVACY, IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH 
RESEARCH 42–43 (S.J. Nass, L.A. Levit & L.O. Gostin, eds. 2009) [hereinafter IOM 
RESEARCH] (arguing that research with identifiable health information should not re-
quire consent, in part because obtaining consent can be difficult and costly). 
 88 See generally Mark A. Rothstein, Improve Privacy in Research by Eliminating Informed Consent?  
IOM Report Misses the Mark, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 507 (2009) (challenging the IOM rec-
ommendations on empirical and ethical grounds).  For similar criticisms of proposals to 
use UK National Health Service data for research without patient consent, see generally 
Ian Brown, Lindsey Brown & Douwe Korff, Using NHS Patient Data for Research Without 
Consent, 2(2) LAW, INNOVATION & TECH. 219 (2011); Nikolaus Forgó, My Health Data—
Your Research:  Some Preliminary Thoughts on Different Values in the General Data Protection Reg-
ulation, 5 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 54 (2015). 
 89 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, COMMITTEE ON THE RECOMMENDED SOCIAL AND 
BEHAVIORAL DOMAINS AND MEASURES FOR ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS, INSTITUTE OF 
MEDICINE, CAPTURING SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL DOMAINS AND MEASURES IN ELECTRONIC 
HEALTH RECORDS:  PHASE 2, at 3 (2014). 
 90 Id. at 8, Table S-1. 
 91 See PONEMON INSTITUTE, FOURTH ANNUAL BENCHMARK STUDY OF PATIENT PRIVACY & DATA 
SECURITY (Mar. 2014), www2.idexpertscorp.com/ponemon-report-on-patient-privacy-
data-security-incidents/; Vincent Liu et al., Data Breaches of Protected Health Information in 
the United States (Research Letter), 313 J. OF THE AM. MED. ASS’N 1471 (2015); see also 
Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Office of Civil Rights, Improper Disclosure of Research 
Participants’ Protected Health Information Results in $3.9 Million HIPAA Settlement (Mar. 17, 
2016), http://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2016/03/17/improper-disclosure-research-
participants-protected-health-information-results-in-hipaa-settlement.html#. 
 92 Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 
et seq., Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 226. 
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breach reports as of February 2015.93  Each report covers a breach of 
hundreds, thousands and sometimes millions of records.94 
This overview should demonstrate how the uses of health infor-
mation—current as well as prospective—are expanding with the 
growth in technology, exacerbating tensions between privacy and Big 
Data.  Statutory and common law protections for patient information 
remain patchy.95  While privacy advocates seek greater privacy protec-
tion, powerful public and private institutions encourage legislation to 
expand their access to health information.  Hence, the time is ripe to 
reconsider whether there are any constitutional limits to government 
collection and use of health information. 
III.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE 
We might begin with the presumption that the Fourth Amend-
ment96 does not apply when government compels an entity to pro-
duce another person’s health information.  In other words, such a 
search is an exception to the Fourth Amendment.  Two lines of cases 
 
 93 Breaches Affecting 500 or More Individuals, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breach_report.jsf (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2015). 
 94 For example, hackers broke into the electronic database of information about Anthem 
Inc. (formerly Wellpoint) health insurance enrollees.  Anthem’s stored database, which 
contained eighty million unencrypted Social Security numbers of enrollees, was not en-
crypted, reportedly because encryption would make it harder to share enrollee infor-
mation with health providers and state agencies.  Danny Yadron & Melinda Beck, Health 
Insurer Anthem Didn’t Encrypt Data in Theft, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Feb. 5, 2015, 7:26 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/investigators-eye-china-in-anthem-hack-1423167560.  Hospi-
tals and insurers use random passwords and other mechanisms to enable authorized ac-
cess to patient records in their own internal central database; but the databases them-
selves, where records are stored electronically, may or may not be encrypted or otherwise 
unusable to hackers.  Anthem, undoubtedly like some other companies, may have decid-
ed that information security was not worth the cost.  Id.  Whatever the reason, some com-
panies may find sharing the information more important than safeguarding patient pri-
vacy. 
 95 Latanya Sweeney analogized legal protections for privacy in general to placing a few cloth 
patches randomly on the body instead of dressing it in a whole suit of clothes.  Latanya 
Sweeney, Presentation, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law Sympo-
sium, “What Privacy?  Exploring a Constitutional Right to Information Privacy,” co-
sponsored by the American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights & Responsibili-
ties, Jan. 23, 2015. 
 96 The Fourth Amendment states that 
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
  U.S. CONST., amend. IV. 
996 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 18:3 
 
support this presumption.  First, the third-party doctrine has effec-
tively excised information obtained from third parties from Fourth 
Amendment protection.97  The third-party doctrine presumes that in-
formation held by third parties, like hospitals and health insurers, no 
longer qualifies as the person’s “papers or effects” protected by the 
Fourth Amendment.98  Second, the special needs doctrine has creat-
ed another exception, which has expanded to permit government in-
vasions of privacy for increasingly questionable reasons.99  Thus, it is 
not surprising that most observers would assume that the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect health information to any cognizable 
degree.100 
However, neither line of cases squarely addresses the question 
whether government can compel the production of personally identi-
fiable health information for civil purposes.101  The third-party doc-
trine developed in the context of criminal procedure—investigations 
and prosecutions—which is the subject of most Fourth Amendment 
scholarship.102  Recent special needs cases have considered 
 
 97 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 
(1976). 
 98 See State v. Davis, 12 A.3d 1271, 1273 (N.H. 2010) (finding no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in medical test results provided to law enforcement); People v. Perlos, 462 N.W.2d 
310, 321 (Mich. 1990) (relying on United States v. Miller to find that patients had no pos-
session, or ownership, or reasonable expectation of privacy in blood test results for alco-
hol levels that hospital turned to police in automobile accident investigation).  This pre-
sumption is subject to a growing number of critiques.  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. 
Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that “it may be necessary to re-
consider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in in-
formation voluntarily disclosed to third parties”); Jace C. Gatewood, It’s Raining Katz and 
Jones:  The Implications of United States v. Jones—A Case of Sound and Fury, 33 PACE L. REV. 
683, 684–85 (2013); see generally Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth 
Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39 (2011). 
 99 See infra Part V; see generally Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
100 See, e.g., Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 1, at 111 (“The Supreme Court has not found 
that patients have either a property right or a privacy right associated with their medical 
records.”); Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1501, 1505 (2015); Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Data:  Property, Privacy & the Pub-
lic Interest, 36 AM J. L. & MED. 586, 588 (2010); Edward P. Richards, Collaboration Between 
Public Health and Law Enforcement:  The Constitutional Challenge, 8 EMERGING INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 1157, 1157 (Oct. 2002), http:/ /www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol8no10/02-0465. 
htm (“[U]nder the police power, public health officials . . . may search and seize without 
probable-cause warrants.”). 
101 Fourth Amendment challenges to government access to health information are rare.  But 
see United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274 (6th Cir. 2010); Doe v. Broderick, 225 
F.3d 440, 443 (4th Cir. 2000); State v. Skinner, 10 So.3d 1212, 1213 (La. 2009); New York 
City Health & Hospital Corp. v. Morgenthau (In re Grand Jury Investigation), 779 N.E.2d 
173, 174 (N.Y. 2002); People v. Perlos, 436 N.W.2d 310, 311 (Mich. 1990). 
102 The literature on this topic is vast.  See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:  A 
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (5th ed. 2014); SLOBOGIN, supra note 41; Susan 
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suspicionless searches for civil purposes, but such searches were bodi-
ly invasions—testing for unlawful drug use—not searches for data.103  
Thus, it is worth reviewing the scope and limits of these doctrines to 
see whether or how they might apply to laws mandating the reporting 
of health information and whether there is room for any Fourth 
Amendment protection. 
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the Fourth 
Amendment makes no textual distinction between civil and criminal 
searches.104  As Justice Byron White wrote in Camara v. Municipal 
Court, “It is surely anomalous to say the individual and his private 
property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the 
individual is suspected of criminal behavior.”105  The U.S. Supreme 
Court has certainly applied the Fourth Amendment in the civil con-
text.106  Thus, it cannot be assumed that the Fourth Amendment of-
fers no protection to personal health information solely because the 
information is sought for purposes other than law enforcement. 
Furthermore, demanding information directly from an individual 
certainly qualifies as a search of the person or his papers or effects.107  
A compulsory reporting law would constitute a search or a seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment if the requirement were directed at 
 
Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2007); Ste-
phen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment:  Protecting Third-Party Infor-
mation, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us, Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975 (2007); Lucas Issacharoff 
& Kyle Wirshba, Restoring Reason to the Third Party Doctrine, 100 MINN. L. REV. 987 (2016); 
Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009); Matthew 
D. Lawless, The Third Party Doctrine Redux:  Internet Search Records and the Case for a “Crazy 
Quilt” of Fourth Amendment Protection, 11 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 1 (2007); Solove, supra note 
45. 
103 But see Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 69 (2001).  See also infra Part V. 
104 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 758 (1994) 
(“[T]he Fourth Amendment applies equally to civil and criminal law enforcement.”); 
Delaney, supra note 9, at 11 (“[The] Fourth Amendment . . . unquestionably regulates all 
elements of federal and state government.”). 
105 Camara v. Municipal Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967). 
106 See, e.g., Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 60, 67 (1992) (confirming that the Fourth 
Amendment applies in the civil context and finding that police seizure of tenants’ trailer 
at landlord’s request prior to eviction hearing constitutes a seizure subject to Fourth 
Amendment); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985) (“[T]his Court has never 
limited the Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures to opera-
tions conducted by the police.”); Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321–24 (1978) 
(holding that the Fourth Amendment applies to administrative inspections of private 
commercial property); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301–02 (1967) (noting that the 
Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures regardless of how the matter taken is 
used). 
107 See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506 
(2007). 
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the person whose information is demanded.108  Of course, health in-
formation is typically (although not always) held by a third party, 
such as a medical provider, a laboratory, an insurer, or (these days) 
an Internet server.109 
Two questions arise here.  The first is whether the location of the 
information makes a difference.  The third-party doctrine says that it 
does, but criticism of that conclusion is mounting.110  The second and 
perhaps more important question is whether the person has a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in personal information held by a 
third party.  Each of these questions is discussed below. 
A.  The Third-Party Doctrine and Continuous Reporting 
For decades, the third-party doctrine has operated to close the 
courts to claims that information provided to government by a third 
party violates the Fourth Amendment—primarily in the criminal con-
text.111  The doctrine’s origins are attributed to United States v. Miller, 
in which federal Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”) agents is-
sued a subpoena duces tecum to a bank to obtain Miller’s bank records, 
and the bank turned over the records.112  The ATF was conducting a 
criminal investigation into suspected tax fraud by Miller, who alleged-
ly owned an unregistered still and failed to pay whiskey taxes.  The 
 
108 Hayden, 387 U.S. at 301–02 (stating that Fourth Amendment applies to searches and sei-
zures regardless of how the matter taken is used).  Whether such a search would be rea-
sonable without consent, a warrant, or a court order is a separate issue. 
109 See generally Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531 
(2005) (discussing whether electronic searches of computer data should be deemed 
searches or seizures); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (“A 
‘search’ occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider rea-
sonable is infringed.  A ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful inter-
ference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.”).  Many people are 
keeping their own personal health records separately, such that health care providers are 
no longer the sole record keepers of health data.  See ERIC TOPOL, THE PATIENT WILL SEE 
YOU NOW (2015) (arguing, optimistically, that a new era of mobile devices should enable 
individuals to perform their own diagnostic tests).  Some health records compiled by in-
dividuals for themselves, however, may be stored in the cloud in a personal account or 
through a commercial provider of health monitoring services—who might or might not 
also be considered third parties—and an individual might have several such electronic 
storage sites.  See Nicolas P. Terry, Personal Health Records:  Directing More Costs and Risks to 
Consumers?, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 216 (2009) (comparing electronic health eecords to per-
sonal health records). 
110 See generally SLOBOGIN, supra note 41; Freiwald, supra note 102; Henderson, supra note 98; 
Lawless, supra note 102. 
111 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
112 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437–38 (1976). 
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Supreme Court found that the Fourth Amendment did not protect 
bank records from disclosure pursuant to a grand jury subpoena: 
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and con-
veyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is re-
vealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose 
and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.113 
In Miller, the Court concluded that there was no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in checks, which were “not confidential communica-
tions but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transac-
tions.”114 
Since Miller, it has been generally presumed that a person who 
voluntarily discloses information to a third party, like a bank or an in-
ternet service provider, knowing that the third party would use that 
information in its regular business, abandons his or her expectation 
of privacy in that information and thus, any Fourth Amendment pro-
tection against government access to the information. 
Smith v. Maryland strengthened that assumption when it upheld 
the installation of a pen register at a telephone company’s central of-
fice to monitor the telephone numbers dialed by a man suspected of 
making threatening and obscene calls to a robbery victim.115  The tel-
ephone company acted on a request by police, who had no warrant 
or court order.116  This warrantless search provided the evidence for a 
warrant to search Smith’s home, where more evidence led to Smith’s 
arrest and conviction for the robbery.117 
The Supreme Court gave several reasons for finding that the 
Fourth Amendment posed no bar to the telephone company’s com-
pliance with the police request.  First, the Court distinguished the 
pen register from the listening device attached to a public phone 
booth, which was at issue in Katz,118 on the ground that the pen regis-
ter recorded only numbers dialed and not any communication, spo-
ken words, or content.119  Second, it doubted whether “people in 
 
113 Id. at 443. 
114 Id. at 442. 
115 Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see also Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 
(1968) (adopting Justice John M. Harlan’s concept of reasonable expectation of privacy 
from his concurrence in Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
119 Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 (“Neither the purport of any communication between the caller 
and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed is 
disclosed by pen registers.” (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 
(1977))). 
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general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers 
they dial.”120  Third, it noted that telephone companies routinely used 
pen registers for billing and other regular business purposes.121  Final-
ly, the Court concluded that it “consistently has held that a person 
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily 
turns over to third parties.”122 
Miller and Smith suggest that a patient who voluntarily gives per-
sonal information to a health care provider has no Fourth Amend-
ment claim against any action by government to obtain that infor-
mation from the provider.  After all, the patient has voluntarily 
provided the information, and the provider is using it in the course 
of business—treating the patient and billing for treatment. 
A closer look at the third-party doctrine line of cases, however, re-
veals that they rely on facts that differ from mandatory reporting laws 
in several important respects.  First, the third-party doctrine devel-
oped in cases involving targeted criminal investigations; that is, law 
enforcement sought to obtain information about a person suspected 
of a criminal offense123 or to identify the perpetrator of a crime.124  In 
contrast, government agencies, such as health departments, seek 
mandatory reporting laws to collect health information for civil pur-
poses.125  Civil reporting laws require information about a population, 
none of whose members are suspected of any criminal offense.  Se-
cond, the criminal cases involved one-off investigations, whereas re-
porting laws authorize data collection on an on-going basis. 
Third, most third-party doctrine cases concerned information 
provided more or less voluntarily by the third party to law enforce-
ment.126  In contrast, mandatory reporting laws directly compel the 
 
120 Id. at 742. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 743–44 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976); Couch v. Unit-
ed States, 409 U.S. 322, 335–36 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971); 
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 
(1963)). 
123 White, 401 U.S. at 746–47 (false friends); Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 297–300 (same). 
124 Smith, 442 U.S. at 737–38. 
125 See supra Part II.  Some civil purposes would justify mandatory reporting, just as people 
may have no reasonable expectation of privacy in some of their information; these issues 
are taken up in Part VII. 
126 To be sure, entities providing information in response to a subpoena, as in Miller, might 
not feel that production is truly voluntary, even if they are able to contest the subpoena.  
And federal law required the bank in Miller to maintain the records in the first place, fur-
ther diluting the meaning of “voluntary” in that case. 
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third party to turn data over to government.127  Thus, mandatory re-
porting laws can be seen as government-compelled, continuous, 
suspicionless searches of an entire population’s data, which Miller and 
its progeny never considered.128  This looks like a contemporary anal-
ogy to the general warrant that the Founders crafted the Fourth 
Amendment to prevent, with the search conducted digitally rather 
than physically in the home.129 
The NSA’s bulk collection of data offers a contemporary analogy 
in the criminal context.  The NSA relied on Smith to support the con-
stitutionality of its program, but the legality, as well as the wisdom, of 
that program remains highly controversial.130  If Smith is ultimately de-
termined to not to justify bulk data collection for purposes of investi-
gating terrorism, the third-party doctrine may prove to be fragile 
support for bulk data collection for civil purposes, too.131 
There is a striking similarity between civil surveillance programs 
and the NSA’s bulk collection program.  Both § 215 of the Patriot Act 
and most mandatory reporting laws require the ongoing suspicionless 
collection of data for future data mining.132  Yet one federal circuit 
court of appeals found the NSA’s program was not authorized by the 
 
127 See Lebron v. Sec’y of Fla. Dep’t of Children and Families, 772 F.3d 1352, 1376 (11th  Cir. 
2014). 
128 Miller, 425 U.S. at 444–45 n.6 (“There was no blanket reporting requirement of the sort 
we addressed in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60–84 (1976). . . . We are not confronted with 
a situation in which the Government, through ‘unreviewed executive discretion,’ has 
made a wide-ranging inquiry that unnecessarily ‘[touch]es upon intimate areas of an in-
dividual’s personal affairs.’  California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78–79 (Powell, 
J., concurring).  Here the Government has exercised its powers through narrowly di-
rected subpoenas duces tecum subject to the legal restraints attendant to such process.” (al-
teration in original)). 
129 See TECH. & PRIVACY ADVISORY COMM., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN THE 
FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM 49 (2004), www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/
20040300tapac.pdf (“If conducted without an adequate predicate, [data mining] has the 
potential to be a twenty-first century equivalent of general searches, which the authors of 
the Bill of Rights were so concerned to protect against.”); see also Andresen v. Maryland, 
427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) (noting that the Fourth Amendment prohibits general warrants, 
whereby government conducts “a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belong-
ings”). 
130 See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 826 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding § 215 of the Patriot Act 
does not authorize the bulk metadata collection program); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. 
Supp. 2d 1, 42 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding that § 215 probably violates the Fourth Amend-
ment). 
131 See Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 847 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting “whether the analytical 
framework, much less the rationale” of Smith applies to modern technologies “is ques-
tionable and far from clearly established”). 
132 See Clapper, 785 F.3d at 795–97 (noting also the requirement that the data be kept confi-
dential within the agency and not released except in accordance with strict policies). 
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Act.133  Of particular interest is that court’s discussion of what is “rele-
vant” to an investigation.134  The court concluded that the word “rele-
vant” in § 215 referred only to a particular investigation, not to the 
ongoing collection of all metadata just in case it might prove useful in 
the future.135  It found that “such an expansive concept of ‘relevance’ 
is unprecedented and unwarranted.”136 
Mandatory health data reporting laws are based on a similarly ex-
pansive concept of relevance.  Substitute “medical research” for 
“criminal investigation,” and the court’s explanation could describe 
many health surveillance programs.  For example, newborn screening 
databases are used primarily for research, and APDBs are used to ana-
lyze whether various approaches to health care are cost-effective.  In 
some states, law enforcement can access PDMPs to obtain data about 
possible illegal drug users or prescribers.137  Ironically, the NSA col-
lects less specific information about individuals than do health sur-
veillance programs.  The NSA collected metadata—only telephone 
numbers and email addresses—not the content of calls or emails.138  
Surveillance programs collect names, addresses, test results, and a 
host of other details.139 
Might ACLU v. Clapper suggest that civil surveillance programs are 
at risk?  The relevance of the concept of “relevance” in civil surveil-
lance programs lies in the justification for the initial data collection 
(question one above).  Data are sought for a reason.  Usually data are 
said to be “needed” for a particular purpose, such as investigating the 
source of an outbreak.140  For databases like PDMPs and ACDBs, how-
 
133 Id. at 792. 
134 Under the Patriot Act, the government may apply for an order requiring the production 
of any “tangible things” if it has reasonable grounds to believe that such things “are rele-
vant to an authorized investigation,” 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A), “to protect against inter-
national terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities,” id. § 1861(a)(1).  The scope of 
the application is the same as that of a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court for a grand 
jury investigation.  Id. § 1861(c)(2)(D). 
135 Clapper, 785 F.3d at 815 (finding that the text of § 215 did not permit sweeping up “a vast 
trove of records of metadata concerning the financial transactions or telephone calls of 
ordinary Americans to be held in reserve in a data bank, to be searched if and when at 
some hypothetical future time the records might become relevant to a criminal investiga-
tion”). 
136 Id. at 812. 
137 Finklea et al., supra note 61, at 3. 
138 Clapper, 785 F.3d at 793.  The court also noted that even metadata could permit infer-
ences about content in some instances.  Id. at 794 & n.1 (citing Yves‐Alexandre de 
Montjoye et al., Unique in the Shopping Mall:  On the Reidentifiability of Credit Card Metadata, 
347 SCIENCE 536, 536 (2015)). 
139 MARINER & ANNAS, supra note 33, at 456–57, 460, 544. 
140 Id. at 459. 
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ever, the stated need is similar to the NSA’s claims of relevance to an 
investigation.  Of course, the NSA was looking for terrorists, not epi-
demics or data for medical research.  Could this mean that ongoing 
data collection for criminal purposes violates a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, while doing the same for civil purposes does not? 
A final difference between the third-party doctrine line of cases 
and mandatory health reporting laws lies in attitudes towards the in-
formation at issue.  The third-party doctrine cases conclude that the 
person whose information is held by a third party has either voluntar-
ily abandoned all control over the information or no longer has any 
legitimate property interest or reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the information.141  Neither of these presumptions completely squares 
with public attitudes about health information.142  As to the expecta-
tion of privacy, most patients expect that physicians, hospitals and in-
surers will not disclose identifiable data to the government unless the 
government has an independently justifiable basis for requiring the 
disclosure—beyond the mere fact that it exists in a medical record 
held by a third party.143  State and federal laws protecting the confi-
dentiality of medical records, from the common law duty of confiden-
tiality144 to the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rule,145 support protecting 
 
141 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 73–74 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 
(1976); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 
293, 302 (1966). 
142 See MARY MADDEN, PEW RESEARCH CTR. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN 
THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA, at 32 (2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-
privacy-perceptions/ (reporting a 2014 survey’s findings that, after social security num-
bers (90% very sensitive), respondents reported that their health status and medication 
information is very sensitive (55%) or somewhat sensitive (26%); phone conversations 
were similar (54% very sensitive; 27% somewhat sensitive), as well as email messages (52% 
very sensitive; 25% somewhat sensitive)); see also David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Infor-
mation:  How Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1069, 
1110 (2014) (arguing that the Supreme Court is “wrong to declare that an individual can 
have no ‘legitimate  expectation of privacy’ in anything shared voluntarily with someone 
else,” in part because individuals have different privacy expectations and needs from dif-
ferent entities). 
143 See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (recognizing “the individual interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters”); Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 371 F.3d 
1173, 1179, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that laws authorizing health department access 
to abortion clinic patient records constitute unreasonable searches, because patients and 
physicians have a heightened expectation of privacy in medical information; and that 
abortion clinics were not a regulated industry subject to administrative search standards); 
State v. Skinner, 10 So.3d 1212, 1218 (La. 2009) (noting that “the right to privacy in one’s 
medical and prescription records is an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment). 
144 See e.g., Fort Wayne Women’s Health v. Bd. of Commissioners, Allen Cnty., Indiana, 735 F. 
Supp. 2d 1045, 1057 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (“Medical patients have an actual expectation of 
privacy in their medical records and society sees this expectation as reasonable.”); Alberts 
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health information from unauthorized disclosure.  Such laws reflect 
societal acceptance that the expectation of privacy is objectively rea-
sonable. 
As to voluntarily abandoning control over one’s information, nu-
merous scholars observe that almost all activities of daily life require 
people to trust their identifiable information with third parties, such 
as banks, cable service providers, and retailers.146  The overwhelming 
majority of Americans seek health care every year.147  Individuals have 
no choice but to allow their health care providers and insurers to 
hold identifiable information about them—increasingly in digital 
format. 
Two of the four dissenting Justices in Smith unsuccessfully pressed 
a related argument in 1979.  Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined by 
Justice William J. Brennan, rejected the Smith majority’s reasoning 
that people who give information to third parties “assume the risk” 
that their information will be conveyed to government.148  Assump-
 
v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 118 (Mass. 1985) (“We continue to recognize a patient’s valid 
interest in preserving the confidentiality of medical facts communicated to a physician or 
discovered by the physician through examination.”); Bd. of Med. Quality Assurance v. 
Gherardini, 93 Cal. App. 3d 669, 679 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (“The state of a person’s gastro-
intestinal tract is as much entitled to privacy from unauthorized public or bureaucratic 
snooping as is that person’s bank account, the contents of his library or his membership 
in the NAACP.”); see also Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 450 (4th Cir. 2000) (requiring a 
warrant to access medical/prescription records); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) (“There can be no question that an employee’s 
medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within 
the ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection.”); John B. v. Superior Court, 137 
P.3d 153, 166–67 (Cal. 2006) (the right to privacy extends to medical records). 
145 45 C.F.R. § 160.202(1)(4); 45 C.F.R. § 164.105(a)(2)(ii)(A); see also In the Matter of Mi-
guel M., 950 N.E.2d 107 (N.Y. 2011) (rejecting argument that the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
permitted government to obtain medical records without a court order); Nw. Mem’l 
Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 924, 928–29 (7th Cir. 2004) (quashing a government 
subpoena for abortion records and noting that compliance would be “an invasion of pri-
vacy”). Other federal laws can affect health records.  See, e.g., Genetic Information Non-
discrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233; 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(a); see also Sam 
Kamin, The Private is Public:  The Relevance of Private Actors in Defining the Fourth Amendment, 
46 B.C. L. REV. 83, 85 (2004) (arguing that conceptions of privacy in the private sector 
should influence expectations of privacy under the Fourth Amendment). 
146 See PASQUALE, supra note 41, at 4–5; David Cole, Preserving Privacy in a Digital Age:  Lessons 
of Comparative Constitutionalism, in SURVEILLANCE, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (Fergal Davis et al., eds., 2013); Stephen E. Henderson, After United 
States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 431, 
435 (2013) (“We now live in a world of ubiquitous third party information.”). 
147 John R. Pleis et al., Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Summary Health Statistics for U.S. Adults:  
National Health Interview Survey, 2009, in, 10 VITAL & HEALTH STAT. 1, 124 (2010), http://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_10/sr10_249.pdf. 
148 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 752 (1979) (Marshall, J. dissenting). 
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tion of risk, he argued, implies “some notion of choice,”149 which does 
not exist where a person has “no realistic alternative” to using a “per-
sonal or professional necessity” like a telephone.150  Instead, he con-
tinued, the question is not what risks a person should be presumed to 
accept, but “the risks he should be forced to assume in a free and 
open society.”151 
These features of mandatory reporting laws—ongoing population-
wide, suspicionless searches for civil uses and today’s practical neces-
sity of giving health information to third parties—contrast significant-
ly with the assumptions underlying the third-party doctrine.  The dis-
tinctions suggest that there may be room for Fourth Amendment 
protection of identifiable health data held by health, insurance or in-
ternet service providers—at least in some circumstances.152  To ex-
plore the feasibility of such protection, it may help to know which el-
ements of the third-party doctrine are essential to its retention.  If 
those elements are no longer plausible, then the doctrine need not 
apply in all circumstances. 
B.  Third-Party Doctrine Rationales 
The Supreme Court has offered various, but not always consistent, 
reasons for applying the third-party doctrine.153  One is that a person 
has voluntarily abandoned his information to the third party.  This 
equates telling one’s physician about physical or mental symptoms 
with leaving the trash out for pickup.154  It strains credulity to think 
that a person who confides in her physician believes she is throwing 
out her personal information for anyone to see. 
Another way of viewing the concept of abandonment of one’s in-
formation is to posit that a person who tells another person some-
thing necessarily (and thus voluntarily) consents to the further distri-
 
149 Id. at 749. 
150 Id. at 750.  Echoes of Justice Marshall’s arguments may be found in Riley v. California, 134 
S. Ct. 2473 (2014) and United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  See infra text accompa-
nying notes 162–69. 
151 Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
152 For arguments that the third-party doctrine should be modified or abandoned in the 
criminal context, see LAFAVE, supra note 102, § 2.7 (criticizing Miller); see also Freiwald, 
supra note 102; Henderson, supra note 98; Lawless, supra note 102.  For arguments favor-
ing retaining the doctrine, see generally Kerr, supra note 102. 
153 See Kerr, supra note 107, at 506 (arguing that the Court actually uses four different fact-
dependent approaches to deciding Fourth Amendment claims in the criminal context). 
154 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988). 
1006 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 18:3 
 
bution of his or her information.155  This voluntary consent rationale 
is consistent with the principle that consent to a search renders the 
search reasonable without probable cause or a warrant.156  However, 
the seminal cases that rely on consent to justify a warrantless search 
involve a defendant who expressly agreed to the search in person.157  
Indeed, Georgia v. Randolph suggests that a third party cannot consent 
to a search on behalf of a spouse who is also present in the home.158  
The third-party doctrine departs from the cases of actual consent by 
implying consent where it has not in fact been given.  This looks 
more like constructive consent than voluntary consent, although the 
Supreme Court has not explicitly adopted a theory of constructive 
consent.159 
Justice Antonin Scalia argued, in dissent, that a hospital is free to 
voluntarily report the results of a patient’s diagnostic tests to the po-
lice, because reporting by the hospital is consensual and therefore 
not a Fourth Amendment violation.160  Under this view, it is the con-
sent of the third party, not of the patient, that controls.161  Justice 
Scalia concludes that “information obtained through violation of a 
relationship of trust is obtained consensually, and is hence not a 
 
155 This is the reasoning seen in the false friend cases.  See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 
U.S. 745, 751 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 293 (1966) (quoting Lopez v. 
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
156 See Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search?  Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and 
Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 123 (2002) (arguing that many third-party 
doctrine cases should be reevaluated under consent principles); Christine Jolls, Privacy 
and Consent Over Time:  The Role of Agreement in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 54 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1693, 1694 (2013) (describing when and how consent to searches has been de-
terminative); Kerr, supra note 102, at 589–90 (arguing that third-party doctrine cases are 
better viewed as cases of consent to disclosure rather than abandonment of privacy expec-
tations). 
157 See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (concerning an in-person 
consent to search of a car). 
158 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 112 (2006).  But see Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 
1126, 1129 (2014) (finding that once the objecting occupant is removed from the prem-
ises, a third party can consent to a search). 
159 See Jolls, supra note 156, at 1701 (arguing that the validity of consent could vary depend-
ing on whether the search is contemporaneous with or much later than the consent).  
Cases involving drug testing of government employees have not relied on express, con-
temporaneous consent by individual employees.  Instead, their “consent” to testing was a 
condition of their employment.  See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 
656, 672 (1989) (upholding drug testing of applicants for U.S. Custom Service jobs in-
volving drug interdiction or carrying a firearm); see also infra Part IV. 
160 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 96 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
161 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248 (stating that a search with consent does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment). 
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search.”162  As precedent for this conclusion, however, Justice Scalia 
relies on criminal cases in which a criminal suspect or defendant has 
confided something about a crime to an informant, and the inform-
ant passes the information on to law enforcement.163  While the de-
fendant may have hoped or even expected the informer would not 
betray the confidence, the informant had no duty of confidentiality 
to the defendant.  Those facts differ from a patient’s justifiable reli-
ance on a health provider’s duty to keep medical information confi-
dential.164  More importantly, a provider who is compelled by law to 
report patient data to a government agency does not voluntarily con-
sent to disclose the information.165  Thus, the false friend and willing 
informant cases offer no precedent for the notion that providers con-
sent to disclosing data pursuant to mandatory reporting laws. 
The abandonment/consent rationale has lost most of its credibil-
ity in today’s interdependent economy.  Only those living “off the 
grid” can avoid providing detailed personal information to accom-
plish the most basic tasks of daily living.166  Bank, telephone, cable, in-
ternet, insurance, employment, household purchases, and most other 
ordinary transactions require entrusting third parties with detailed 
personal information.167  The information is often particularly sensi-
 
162 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 96 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining how information obtained 
through a violation of trust is consensual and thus does not trigger a Fourth Amendment 
violation). 
163 See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 746–47 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 
U.S. 293, 311 (1966); United States v. Dunning, 312 F.3d 528, 531 (1st Cir. 2002) (hold-
ing that a prison inmate had no reasonable expectation of privacy in letters sent to girl-
friend). 
164 Fort Wayne Women’s Health v. Bd. of Commissioners, Allen Cty., Indiana, 735 F. Supp. 
2d 1045, 1057 (N.D. Ind. 2010); Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 118 (Mass. 1985). 
165 See Carroll v. City of Westminster, 233 F.3d 208, 210 (4th Cir. 2000) (drug testing); Au-
brey v. Sch. Bd. of Lafayette Parish, 148 F.3d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 1998) (drug testing); Nat’l 
Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that “a 
search [drug testing] otherwise unreasonable [under the Fourth Amendment] cannot be 
redeemed by a public employer’s exaction of a ‘consent’ to the search as a condition of 
employment”); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1310 (8th Cir. 1987) (drug testing); 
see also Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57 
OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 701 (1996) (arguing for use of the special needs doctrine for routine 
investigations in the employment context); Paul M. Secunda, Privatizing Workplace Privacy, 
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 277, 282 (2012) (arguing for using the special needs doctrine for 
routine suspicionless investigations and probable cause for individual investigations of 
wrongdoing). 
166 See Posner, supra note 30, at 248 (“[A] person would have to be a hermit to be able to 
function in our society without voluntarily disclosing a vast amount of personal infor-
mation to a vast array of public and private demanders.”); see also supra note 109. 
167 Laura Donahue, Bulk Data Collection:  Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 870 (2014) (stating that “[t]he extent to which we rely on electron-
ic communications to conduct our daily lives is of a fundamentally different scale and 
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tive in the context of the physician-patient relationship.  Thus, the 
idea that disclosure is voluntary or that it equates to consent to fur-
ther disclosure or to granting a third party control over the infor-
mation seems implausibly archaic.168  Rather, applying the third-party 
doctrine to obtain information that a person cannot realistically avoid 
giving third parties is functionally the same as allowing the govern-
ment to seize the information directly from the person.169 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Riley v. California170 and United 
States v. Jones171 suggest some support for this conclusion.  Justice 
Sotomayor, in an often-quoted concurrence in Jones, noted: 
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to 
third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which peo-
ple reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in 
the course of carrying out mundane tasks. . . . I would not assume that all 
information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a 
limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amend-
ment protection.172 
The unanimous decision in Riley took this sentiment to heart, rec-
ognizing that digital technology and information pose new challeng-
es to Fourth Amendment doctrines.  The Court concluded that the 
police needed a warrant to search the arrested suspect’s smart phone, 
because the phone’s contents could not be considered part of an 
otherwise permissible warrantless search incident to an arrest.173  
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion rejected the government’s argument 
that searching a cell phone was materially indistinguishable from 
searching physical items: 
That is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable 
from a flight to the moon.  Both are ways of getting from point A to point 
 
complexity than the situation that existed at the time the Court heard arguments in 
Smith”). 
168 See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 638, 
647 (2015) (arguing that “sharing information with a doctor is the precondition of ob-
taining medical care,” rendering such sharing involuntary). 
169 Donald A. Dripps, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, MINN. L. REV., manuscript at 24 
(forthcoming 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2692296 (“To 
the extent that the consumer has no way to opt-out of sharing with the government what 
she shares with the provider, the data collected are indistinguishable from the govern-
ment acquiring . . . data directly.”). 
170 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring). 
171 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). 
172 Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
173 The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement was not at issue, be-
cause police searched the phone about two hours after taking Riley into custody.  See Ri-
ley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480–81. 
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B, but little else justifies lumping them together.  Modern cell phones, as 
a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the 
search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.174 
The opinion described the vast amount of information that can be 
accessed through a cell phone, a description that also applies to any 
device that uses the internet, specifically noting that “a cell phone 
search would typically expose to the government far more than the 
most exhaustive search of a house.”175  Among the sensitive infor-
mation mentioned is health information: 
[C]ertain types of data are also qualitatively different.  An Internet search 
and browsing history, for example, can be found on an Internet-enabled 
phone and could reveal an individual’s private interests or concerns—
perhaps a search for certain symptoms of disease, coupled with frequent 
visits to WebMD.176 
Riley makes clear that the government may need some individual-
ized suspicion to search the contents of a person’s telephone, which 
is typically held remotely by third parties:  “Our answer to the ques-
tion of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized in-
cident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”177 
The Riley opinion thus suggests that the Court is beginning to 
recognize that the transformation wrought by information technolo-
gy may require easing the categorical boundaries of Fourth Amend-
ment doctrines.  This may translate to the third-party doctrine. 
A second reason for the third-party doctrine appears to be that 
the third party collects the information for its own use in its busi-
ness.178  Stated another way, the information about an individual be-
comes the property of the third party, who is free to dispose of the in-
formation as it pleases, like the bank in Miller or the telephone 
company in Smith.  Even if one accepts this reasoning, it does not 
necessarily follow that the government is entitled to obtain the in-
formation without the consent of either the third party who holds the 
 
174 Id. at 2488–89. 
175 Id. at 2491.  Riley can be viewed as a recognizing that the breadth of information uncov-
ered or perused would grossly exceed the purposes for which a warrantless search inci-
dent to arrest is conducted (officer safety and spoliation of evidence) and therefore has 
constitutional significance.  The sensitivity of the information may be of secondary im-
portance, because the search of a wallet or purse incident to arrest can reveal equally sen-
sitive information, such as a prescription bottle or an Alcoholics Anonymous thirty-day 
chip. 
176 Id. at 2490. 
177 Id. at 2495. 
178 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 
(1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth 
Amendment and New Technologies:  Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 101, 147–50 (2004). 
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information or the person who is the information source.  Mandatory 
reporting laws do not allow the third party to refuse.  Thus, by itself, 
the premise that the third party has custody or control over the in-
formation does not answer the question whether the government can 
compel the third party to turn it over. 
Holders of medical information might be considered bailees, who 
hold the information for limited purposes and are not free to other-
wise dispose of it without the source’s permission.179  So far, most cas-
es have limited this concept of bailment to circumstances in which 
the bailor was not expected to keep the items for its own use.180  
Health providers do use a patient’s information in their business, al-
beit for the patient’s benefit.  While medical records may facilitate 
the provider’s treatment of patients, they are not created solely to 
manage business practices.  Medical records contain information that 
a patient entrusts to her physician (or hospital or other provider) for 
specific, limited purposes.181  The physician, who owes quasi-fiduciary 
duties to the patient, is often viewed as holding the contents of the 
patient’s medical record as a custodian or possibly a type of trustee 
for the benefit of the patient.182 
While physicians and health care facilities may have custody of 
medical records, they do not necessarily view themselves as owning 
the contents in the same fashion or to the same extent that banks 
own their business records of financial transactions.  Scholarly views 
of medical record ownership vary, with some commentators arguing 
that while the provider may own the record, the patient owns the in-
formation in the record.183  Others note that patients cannot assert 
any ownership interest in medical records or the information they 
contain.184  And state laws vary in their attribution of ownership to the 
 
179 See Henderson, supra note 146, at 437–38 (suggesting that the Fourth Amendment might 
protect data left with a bailee that is not for the bailee’s own use). 
180 See, e.g., United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (bag left with store 
clerk); United States v. Barry, 853 F.2d 1479, 1482 (8th Cir. 1988) (suitcase left at air-
port).  But see United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 282-83 (6th Cir. 2010) (email held 
by service provider). 
181 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“The patient’s reliance up-
on the physician is a trust of the kind which traditionally has exacted obligations beyond 
those associated with arms-length transactions.”). 
182 Principles of medical ethics confirm the physician’s duty of confidentiality.  AMA, Princi-
ples of Medical Ethics, www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/
code-medical-ethics/principles-medical-ethics.page (“IV. A physician shall . . . safeguard 
patient confidences and privacy within the constraints of the law.”). 
183 See GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS 227 (Eve Carey, ed., 3d ed. 2004). 
184 See, e.g., Barbara Evans, Much Ado About Data Ownership, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 70, 74–75 
(2011); Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 1 at 111. 
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patient or the provider, with many not expressly addressing the is-
sue.185  In these circumstances, one cannot confidently conclude that 
the information in medical records is indisputably the property of the 
third party to do with as it chooses. 
Indeed, Professor Jack Balkin argues that professionals like physi-
cians qualify as “information fiduciaries” who must not breach confi-
dentiality without the patient’s consent or a very strong reason.186  
Kiel Brennan-Marquez argues that such information fiduciaries ac-
quire obligations not because they are trusted in fact, but because 
they perform an important social function that requires information 
sharing.187  The fiduciary duties of care and loyalty—and confidential-
ity—are normative constraints intended to prevent exploitation of 
the more vulnerable party by the more powerful party in an arm’s 
length relationship.188 
There is a strong ethical tradition in medicine, codified in statutes 
and case law, of keeping patient information confidential.189  Of 
course, common law duties of confidentiality themselves do not give 
rise to constitutional protection.  After all, Miller did not consider that 
common law recognition of a confidential relationship between a 
bank and a depositor affected the depositor’s expectation of priva-
cy.190  Congress reacted to Miller by enacting the Right to Financial 
Privacy Act of 1978 to permit bank customers to challenge the gov-
ernment’s justification for subpoenas of bank records.191  Unlike the 
Court, Congress at least recognized that people do have some rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in their financial information, even if 
government sometimes has good reason to override that expectation.  
 
185 Cf. FLA. STAT. § 456.057 (1) (“[T]he term “records owner” means any health care practi-
tioner who generates a medical record after making a physical or mental examination of, 
or administering treatment or dispensing legend drugs to, any person.”); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 70 (2015) (implying that clinics and identified heath facilities own 
the records because the obligations to maintain them transfer with a change in ownership 
of the facilities themselves); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03(A) (2015) (“Health records 
are the property of the health care entity maintaining them. . . .”). 
186 Jack Balkin, Information Fiduciaries in the Digital Age, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 5, 2014), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/information-fiduciaries-in-digital-age.html. 
187 Brennan–Marquez, supra note 168, at 613, 628 (arguing that the concept of misplaced 
trust should not apply to information fiduciaries like hospitals and physicians). 
188 Id. at 649–51. 
189 See, e.g., AMA, Principles of Medical Ethics, supra note 182; Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 
113, 118–20 (Mass. 1985) . 
190 See Peterson v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 367 P.2d 284 (Idaho 1961) (concerning breach of 
duty of confidentiality by bank); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path:  
Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 133 (2007) (comparing U.S. and 
British tort law governing breach of confidentiality). 
191 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–21. 
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The question is whether all privacy protection for records held by 
third parties must come from the legislature and none from the 
Fourth Amendment.192 
A third rationale for the third-party doctrine is that the person has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information.  This reason 
has at least two different interpretations.  One is essentially the same 
as voluntary abandonment or consent and is unpersuasive for the 
same reasons.  The second is that the information at issue is not 
something that society is prepared to recognize as worth protecting.  
Or, in Katz terminology, the expectation is not “one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”193  This reason has more bite, 
but is fact-dependent.  As noted above, there are enough laws limit-
ing the disclosure of health information to conclude that society ac-
cepts as reasonable an expectation of privacy in that information.  
Such laws recognize that it is the content of the information that de-
termines whether it is worthy of expectations of privacy, not who 
holds it.194  Society may recognize some information as warranting 
privacy protection, regardless of where it sits. 
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Supreme Court recognized that 
patients have a reasonable expectation that the information they pro-
vide to their physicians will be used solely for the purpose of their 
own diagnosis and treatment and not shared with other entities with-
out the patient’s consent—at least for law enforcement purposes.195  
The state hospital in Ferguson tested urine samples from pregnant 
women in prenatal care or at delivery to identify cocaine users and 
reported those with positive tests to police, all without a warrant, 
probable cause, individualized suspicion or (the Court assumed) the 
patients’ knowledge or consent.196  The police initially arrested all re-
 
192 See Charles E. MacLean, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof:  The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Is 
Rudderless in the Digital Age Unless Congress Continually Resets the Privacy Bar, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. 
& TECH. 47, 76 (2014) (arguing that Congress should periodically amend laws like the 
ECPA and SCA to protect digital privacy, thereby establishing a floor of reasonable expec-
tations of privacy). 
193 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
194 But see Brennan–Marquez, supra note 168, at 639–40 (arguing against focusing on the 
sensitivity of the information, rather than the fiduciary duties of the holder). 
195 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001). 
196 Patients were selected for testing if they met at least one of the following nine criteria:  
no, late, or incomplete prenatal care; abruption placentae; intrauterine fetal death; pre-
term labor or intrauterine growth retardation “of no obvious cause”; previously known 
drug or alcohol abuse; or unexplained congenital anomalies.  Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70–73.  
These factors, however, could be present for many reasons unrelated to drug use.  See id. 
at 76; Emmalee S. Bandstra et al., Prenatal Drug Exposure:  Infant and Toddler Outcomes, 29 J. 
ADDICTIVE DISEASES 245 (2010); Jeanne Flavin & Lynn M. Paltrow, Punishing Pregnant 
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ported patients on drug charges.  Later, under a modified policy, on-
ly patients who failed to enter and comply with a drug treatment pro-
gram were arrested.  The hospital argued that its search and report-
ing policy was justified by the special need to protect the health of 
both mother and child.197  The Court rejected that claim, finding that 
the “Fourth Amendment’s general prohibition against nonconsensu-
al, warrantless, and suspicionless searches necessarily applies to such 
a policy.”198 
A threshold question was whether the patients had consented to 
providing a urine sample for the purpose of drug testing and report-
ing test results to law enforcement.199  The Supreme Court majority 
presumed lack of consent, and on remand to decide that issue, the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was insufficient evi-
dence that any patient “validly consented to the taking and testing of 
her urine for law enforcement, as opposed to medical, purposes”.200  Since 
the Supreme Court’s decision rested heavily on the law enforcement 
purpose of the drug tests, the patients’ lack of consent cemented the 
conclusion that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. 
Ferguson did not address the question whether police could com-
pel the hospital to produce the drug test results if there had been no 
policy in effect and physicians had ordered the tests solely for pur-
poses of treating the women.  The Court did not mention the third-
party doctrine.  It analyzed the case in terms of the special needs doc-
trine, finding that law enforcement is not a special need that would 
justify an exception to the warrant requirement.  But, in doing so, it 
made clear that the patients had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in their medical information: 
The reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical patient un-
dergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the results of those tests will 
not be shared with non-medical personnel without her consent.201 
 
Drug-Using Women:  Defying Law, Medicine, and Common Sense, 29 J. ADDICTIVE DISEASES 231, 
233 (2010); Barry Zuckerman, Drug-Exposed Infants:  Understanding the Medical Risks, 1 THE 
FUTURE OF CHILDREN 26, 28–31 (1991).  The vast majority tested were poor women of 
color.  Dorothy Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies:  Women of Color, Equality, 
and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1421 (1991). 
197 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81.  For further discussion of the special needs doctrine, see infra Part 
V. 
198 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 86 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  The urine tests were “indisputably 
searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at 76. 
199 The Court was not entirely clear whether it was addressing consent to (1) taking the sam-
ple, (2) testing the sample for cocaine, or (3) reporting the results to law enforcement, 
but appeared to be particularly concerned about (3).  See id. at 77–80. 
200 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 308 F.3d 380, 395 (4th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original). 
201 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78. 
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The implication is that law enforcement would need a warrant, or at 
least a subpoena, to obtain the drug test results.  In this case, howev-
er, the police had no a priori reason to suspect any of the patients of a 
crime.202 
Nevertheless, one might ask why the Court did not consider the 
third-party doctrine.  In theory, that doctrine would allow the hospi-
tal to give medical test results to the police voluntarily, leaving the pa-
tients with no Fourth Amendment protection.  Indeed, this is what 
Justice Scalia argued, dissenting from the Ferguson majority’s opin-
ion.203  In the dissent’s view, if a patient consents to a medical test in 
course of ordinary treatment, she loses any expectation of privacy in 
the results of that test. 
What might Ferguson imply for mandatory reporting laws requiring 
test results or other medical information to be reported to a govern-
ment agency?  The dissent argued that the majority’s opinion would 
mean that “the Fourth Amendment would invalidate those many state 
laws that require physicians to report gunshot wounds, evidence of 
spousal abuse, and . . . evidence of child abuse.”204  In a footnote, the 
dissent adds, “If voluntary betrayal of a trust in mere cooperation with 
the police constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, surely betrayal of 
a trust at the direction of the legislature must be.”205  Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, concurring in the majority’s opinion, disagreed, noting 
without explanation that the decision “does not call into question the 
validity of mandatory reporting laws such as child abuse laws which 
require teachers to report evidence of child abuse to the proper au-
thorities, even if arrest and prosecution is the likely result.”206  These 
brief comments cannot be said to resolve the question. 
None of the Justices’ opinions actually analyzes mandatory report-
ing laws, of course.  State reporting laws are enacted in order to per-
mit health care providers to violate their duty of confidentiality by 
disclosing patient information.  If there is no constitutional impedi-
ment to voluntary reporting by providers, why do states bother to en-
act such laws?  One answer may be that providers desire statutory 
confirmation that they will not be subject to liability to patients for 
such disclosures.  If true, it turns reporting laws into symbolic ges-
tures.  Legislatures do sometimes grant immunity from liability to 
 
202 See supra note 186. 
203 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 96 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying notes 123–
26. 
204 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 97 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
205 Id. at 96 n.3. 
206 Id. at 90 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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those entities who comply with regulations that the state is empow-
ered to adopt.207  But, such legislation is not required.  Why, then, 
would states presume that they must enact affirmative legislation to 
justify the compelled reporting of medical information?  The Court’s 
decisions applying the third-party doctrine do not offer a clear an-
swer. 
It is possible that the third-party doctrine could be extended to 
compel third party reporting on an ongoing basis without individual-
ized suspicion.208  It is also possible that the third-party doctrine 
should not apply to those circumstances at all, either because it has 
no application in the civil context or because other Fourth Amend-
ment doctrines are better suited to resolving that issue.  Both the line 
of cases involving administrative searches and that involving 
suspicionless searches for purposes of ‘special needs’ beyond law en-
forcement address the application of the Fourth Amendment in the 
civil context.  To those cases, we now turn. 
IV.  ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES 
The line of cases developing the special needs doctrine grew 
alongside the cases addressing administrative searches, such that the 
special needs doctrine includes elements of the administrative search 
exception plus its own increasingly opaque boundaries.  It is worth 
considering administrative searches themselves, since reporting laws 
could be seen as a form of searching the records of health entities. 
Administrative searches conducted without probable cause were 
initially justified as a narrow exception to Fourth Amendment re-
quirements.209  The exception applied first to inspections of regulated 
business premises and housing.  Routine inspections for compliance 
with health and safety regulations were believed necessary to identify 
and prevent hidden dangers, such as defective heating or electrical 
systems, but government typically had no probable cause to suspect 
 
207 Good Samaritan Laws often offer protections from liability for classes of identified indi-
viduals (usually medical professionals) for unintended harms caused by the use of their 
skills to provide aid, usually in an emergency outside their practice.  For a listing of state 
laws, see Suzanne E. Turner, Good Samaritan Laws:  A Comparative Study of Laws That Protect 
First Responders Who Assist Accident Victims, A RESEARCH NOTE BY DECHERT LLP FOR 
SAVELIFE FOUNDATION (May 2014), http://www.trust.org/contentAsset/raw-data/
7be34cce-ea0d-4c90-8b39-53427acf4c43/file. 
208 The Fourth Amendment “generally bars officials from undertaking a search or seizure 
absent individualized suspicion.”  Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997). 
209 LAFAVE, supra note 102, §§ 10.1–10.2; see also Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2457 
(2015) (“To classify hotels as pervasively regulated would permit what has always been a 
narrow exception to swallow the rule.”). 
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that any particular person or business was violating the law.210  Dan-
gerous conditions that needed remediation were not necessarily ap-
parent, so neither probable cause nor location-specific suspicion 
could be expected.211  To prevent arbitrary or abusive searches, a 
search warrant was required to describe the type of business or geo-
graphic area to be searched.212  Instead of basing warrants on proba-
ble cause, however, a court could determine whether government has 
“a valid public interest [that] justifies the intrusion contemplated.”213 
As the scope of business regulation expanded, licensing and simi-
lar legislation included requirements for when and how such routine 
inspections took place.214  These requirements became an accepted 
substitute for the warrant requirement as a check on arbitrary gov-
ernment action.215  The Court summarized the criteria for a permissi-
ble warrantless search as follows:  (1) the regulatory scheme furthers 
a “substantial” government interest; (2) the warrantless inspections 
are “necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme”; and (3) the “in-
spection program, in terms of certainty and regularity of its applica-
tion,” is a “constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.”216 
Still, warrantless administrative searches were limited to searches 
that were not looking for evidence of a crime,217 were conducted pur-
 
210 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967) (striking down fire code inspections, but 
indicating that warrants for future inspections could be issued pursuant to a more flexible 
standard for probable cause to enforce regulations). 
211 See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (auto disassembly business); Marshall v. 
Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (electrical and plumbing installation); United States v. 
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (licensed pawn shop and firearms dealer); Colonnade Cater-
ing Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (licensed liquor store). 
212 Camara v. Municipal Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (holding that annual inspection 
for housing code violations required a warrant, but warrant could be based on likelihood 
of finding violations in a geographic area instead of individualized suspicion).  A warrant 
could encompass an entire geographic area or an industry within that area, because offi-
cials need to know whether that regulated population is complying with health, safety, 
fire and sanitation requirements.  Id. at 538. 
213 Id. at 539. 
214 See id. at 528 (“The basic purpose of this Amendment . . . is to safeguard the privacy and 
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials.”). 
215 See Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 255, 
262–70 (2011) (describing the development of administrative search doctrine). 
216 Burger, 482 U.S. at 702–03 (citation omitted).  The second criterion allows warrantless 
inspections where advance notice would allow violations to be concealed or eliminated.  
Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316; see, 387 U.S. at 545. 
217 See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) (striking down checkpoint to search 
vehicles for illegal aliens).  The distinction between civil and criminal searches is not al-
ways as clear as the doctrine suggests, because criminal sanctions such as fines and incar-
ceration are often authorized and imposed for refusing a search or for violations found as 
a result of an inspection.  Camara, 387 U.S. at 531. 
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suant to statutory rules that limited official discretion,218 did not sus-
pect or target individuals, and where the intrusion on privacy was 
minimal and not personal.219  As government found more reasons to 
look for problems, the focus of analysis shifted from the earlier goal 
of ensuring safe premises to the reasonableness of the government’s 
purpose in obtaining certain information and the procedural regular-
ity of the search process.220  Thus, the government’s reason for con-
ducting inspections without any prior suspicion of individualized 
wrongdoing assumed increasing salience in doctrinal analysis, over-
shadowing concern for intrusions on personal privacy. 
Many decisions do permit administrative subpoenas in the civil 
regulatory context to investigate threats to employee health and safe-
ty. These decisions fit within the original conception of administrative 
searches—enforcement of civil regulatory requirements pursuant to 
express procedural requirements.  For example, the Mine Safety 
Health Administration’s interest in the health and safety of miners 
outweighed the miners’ interest in keeping their medical information 
out of the wrong hands in Big Ridge, Inc. v. Federal Mine Safety and 
Health Review Commission.221  Mine Safety Health Administration 
(“MSHA”) regulations required mine operators to allow inspectors to 
obtain medical and personnel records to verify the validity of the op-
erator’s reports on injuries to miners.  In this case, MSHA sought the 
records without a warrant to see whether an operator with many past 
violations was underreporting injuries. 
The court noted that United States v. Miller might be thought to 
preclude any Fourth Amendment right to privacy on the part of the 
miners, because the records were in the custody of the mine opera-
tor.222  But it also found that “some personal records are so private 
that, even when entrusted to another, an individual retains some 
 
218 Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 605 (1981). 
219 Where a search could be based on individualized suspicion, however, probable cause or a 
warrant was often required.  See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979) (reject-
ing random vehicle stops to find unlicensed drivers in favor of targeting vehicles in viola-
tion of motor vehicle laws). 
220 The Camara Court recognized that a warrant for an administrative search could not be 
based on probable cause for finding individual violators.  Instead, a warrant could en-
compass an entire geographic area or an industry within that area, because officials need 
to know whether that entire population is complying with health, safety, fire and sanita-
tion requirements.  Camara, 387 U.S. at 535; see also Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 198–200 (1993); Scott E. Sundby, A Re-
turn to Fourth Amendment Basics:  Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. 
REV. 383, 383–86 (1988). 
221 715 F.3d 631, 644 (7th Cir. 2013). 
222 Id. at 649. 
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amount of protection of the privacy of the records in the third party’s 
custody.”223  This presented “a difficult question of balancing” for the 
court.224  It found that the demands for records were best understood 
as administrative subpoenas, rather than warrantless searches.  They 
were justified without a warrant because the record request was nec-
essary to protect the workers, it met the administrative search criteria 
of Burger, and MSHA was legally required to keep miners’ medical in-
formation confidential.225 
Earlier, in United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., the National 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”) received a 
request from an employee union to conduct a “health hazard evalua-
tion” at a Westinghouse plant.226  After inspecting the facility, NIOSH 
issued a subpoena to obtain employee medical records to determine 
whether employees were experiencing allergic reactions to 
hexahydrophthalic anhydride (“HHPA”).  The circuit court found 
that the employees’ medical records were entitled to privacy protec-
tion under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, without dis-
cussing the Fourth Amendment.227  But it concluded that the employ-
ees’ privacy interests were outweighed by a combination of factors:  
the agency’s interest in protecting occupational safety and health; its 
need for the records in order to compare employees’ medical condi-
tions before and after exposure to HHPA; the information was not 
highly sensitive, consisting primarily of routine test results; and 
NIOSH procedures for keeping the data secure and confidential.  
Thus, the court issued an order enforcing the subpoena, but none-
theless allowed each employee to object to the production of his or 
her own records.228  This result may have been influenced by the fact 
 
223 Id. 
224 Id.  
225 Id. at 650 (describing how the federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, required the agency to 
keep the employees’ personal information confidential and not disclose it to others with-
out the employee’s consent).  In addition, the federal Mine Safety and Health Act al-
lowed the mine operators to contest proposed penalties for noncompliance, which the 
operator did in this case.  Id. at 652. 
226 638 F.2d 570, 572 (3d Cir. 1980). 
227 Id. at 581 n.7 (“[T]he best solution-no matter who may be the custodian of the records in 
the particular instance-is to require that the party seeking to secure the records by sub-
poena give the patient notice of the issuance of the subpoena, and to permit the patient 
to contest its enforcement by whatever means is regarded as satisfying the requirements 
of due process.” (citing Kaiser, Privacy and Medical Record-Keeping, included in Privacy: 
the Collection, Use, and Computerization of Personal Data (Part 2): Joint Senate Hear-
ings before the Ad Hoc Comm. on Government Operations and Subcomm. on Constitu-
tional Rights of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2240, 2246 (June 18–20, 
1974))). 
228 Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 578–80. 
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NIOSH’s investigation was initiated in response to a request on be-
half of the employees themselves. 
These and similar administrative searches of employee medical 
records have one similarity to reporting laws intended to investigate 
contagious disease outbreaks: the agencies are looking for existing 
threats to the health or safety of a particular group of people – 
threats that can be removed and that the agency is authorized to halt.  
The agency may need identifiable information about certain individ-
uals and their current medical status in order to find and stop the 
spread of disease. 
Yet the administrative subpoena cases also differ from other medi-
cal reporting or surveillance systems, like PDMPs, newborn screening 
banks, and registries of immunizations, cancer and other chronic dis-
eases.  The latter are not designed to identify immediate threats to 
the health or safety of a particular group of people.  Rather, they en-
gage in the ongoing collection of data for the purpose of making it 
available for multiple future uses – primarily civil, but occasionally 
criminal.  Thus, these cases offer rather strained analogies for deter-
mining the validity of most health surveillance laws. 
In 2015, a bare 5-4 majority of the Court constrained the scope of 
administrative searches in a case where the government’s reason was 
not questioned.  In Los Angeles v. Patel, it concluded that the adminis-
trative search exception applies only to closely regulated businesses – 
those that are comprehensively regulated and inherently “pose a 
clear and significant risk to the public welfare,” and hotels did not fall 
into this category.229  Hotel operators successfully challenged a 116-
year-old city ordinance requiring them to record identifying infor-
mation about guests and allow police to inspect the guest registers on 
demand.  Noncompliance was a misdemeanor.  The Court held that 
its prior decisions required the subject of an administrative search to 
have an “opportunity to obtain precompliance review before a neu-
tral decisionmaker.”230  This would allow administrative subpoenas, 
 
229 Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2454 (2015).  The Court said that “searches con-
ducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by [a] judge or [a] magistrate 
[judge], are per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.”  Id. at 2452 (internal quotation marks omitted).  It further noted 
that it had recognized only four such industries in past decisions.  Id. at 2454 (citing New 
York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (automobile junkyard); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 
594 (1981) (mining); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972) (firearms deal-
ers); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 7 U.S. 72, 76–77 (1970) (liquor sales)).  
230 Id. at 2452. 
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but also permit the subject of the subpoena to seek an order to 
quash.231 
Patel is a narrow, but significant, ruling.  The majority assumed 
that the searches authorized by the ordinance “serve a special need 
other than conducting criminal investigations:  They ensure compli-
ance with the recordkeeping requirement, which in turn deters crim-
inals from operating on the hotel’s premises.”232  Nevertheless, the 
Court also noted in a footnote that the law was facially unconstitu-
tional, even if the search’s purpose were to facilitate criminal investi-
gations.233  In particular, it emphasized that closely regulated indus-
tries are the exception, not the rule.234  Laws merely requiring a 
license and adherence to sanitary standards are not enough to quali-
fy.235  The dissenting Justices disagreed with this analysis, finding the 
city ordinance “eminently reasonable”236 and meeting the Burger 
standards.237  Thus, the Court seems divided on how to define permis-
sible, suspicionless administrative searches. 
Should health care providers, pharmacies, or insurers be consid-
ered closely regulated industries for purposes of permitting mandato-
ry reporting?  These entities certainly have a health and safety mis-
sion, but it is not clear whether the Supreme Court would 
characterize them as closely regulated for purposes of the administra-
tive search exception to the Fourth Amendment.238  One obstacle to 
analogizing reporting laws to administrative searches is that reporting 
laws (in contrast to licensure laws) lack the administrative regulatory 
structures authorizing and constraining agency investigations of an 
industry.  That is, the reporting statutes do not typically include Burg-
er standards regulating access to medical records.  If government 
 
231 Id. at 2452–53 (“Absent an opportunity for precompliance review, the ordinance creates 
an intolerable risk that searches authorized by it will exceed statutory limits, or be used as 
a pretext to harass hotel operators and their guests.”). 
232 Id. at 2452 (noting that the hotels did not challenge the requirement to keep a guest reg-
istry or the legitimacy of the city’s interest, especially in preventing human trafficking). 
233 Id. at 2452 n.2. 
234 Id. at 2455; see also Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 787 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(striking down warrantless search of records kept by sexually explicit film producers as vi-
olation of Fourth Amendment).  In Free Speech Coalition, Inc., the court found that because 
this was not an administrative search of a closely regulated industry and there was no real 
risk of hiding or destroying records of actors’ ages, a warrant would be needed to search 
records.  Id. at 171–72. 
235 Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2455. 
236 Id. at 2457 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
237 Id. at 2459. 
238 See, e.g., Williams v. Kentucky, 213 S.W.3d 671, 678 (Ky. 2006) (finding that a “warrantless 
raid” on a medical clinic to find evidence of unlawful physician prescriptions of con-
trolled substances was not an administrative search of a closely regulated industry). 
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could require specific data to be reported simply as part of an admin-
istrative search, it should also be able to require access to the com-
plete medical records of the facility.  Patel suggests that there must be 
more justification than this. 
Other federal and state court decisions support the conclusion 
that patients have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their medi-
cal records.239  These cases typically require probable cause for a war-
rant or court order to obtain medical records for a criminal investiga-
tion or to enforce an administrative subpoena.240 
An interesting example is Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden.241  There, 
physicians who provide abortion services challenged the state’s law 
requiring them, inter alia, to submit to warrantless inspections of their 
offices and provide unredacted patient medical records and send ul-
trasound prints to third parties.242  The circuit court noted that the 
reason for allowing warrantless administrative searches for regulatory 
purposes is that closely regulated enterprises have a diminished ex-
pectation of privacy.243  In contrast, it found, “the expectation of pri-
vacy is heightened” in abortion clinics.244  This heightened expectation 
 
239 See Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 450–51 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that society recognizes 
as objectively reasonable a patient’s expectation of privacy in records and files of his 
treatment maintained by substance abuse treatment center, because “medical treatment 
records contain intimate and private details that people do not wish to have disclosed, 
expect will remain private, and, as a result, believe are entitled to some measure of pro-
tection from unfettered access by government officials”); United States v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) (“There can be no question that an employ-
ee’s medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well with-
in the ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection.  Information about one’s body 
and state of health is matter which the individual is ordinarily entitled to retain within the 
‘private enclave where he may lead a private life.’”); State v. Skinner, 10 So. 3d 1212, 1218 
(La. 2009) (“[W]e find that the right to privacy in one’s medical and prescription records 
is an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”); King v. 
State, 535 S.E.2d 492, 495 (Ga. 2000) (“[A] patient’s medical information, as reflected in 
the records maintained by his or her medical providers, is certainly a matter which a rea-
sonable person would consider to be private.”); Commonwealth v. Riedel, 651 A.2d 135, 
139–40 (Pa. 1994) (noting that a person has “a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
medical records”). 
240 See Skinner, 10 So. 3d at 1218 (“[A]bsent the narrowly drawn exceptions permitting war-
rantless searches, we hold a warrant is required to conduct an investigatory search of 
medical and/or prescription records.”); State v. Nelson, 941 P.2d 441, 449 (Mont. 1997) 
(finding the state must show probable cause for the issuance of an investigative subpoena 
for the discovery of medical records); Riedel, 651 A.2d at 139–40 (requiring probable 
cause for access to medical records); State v. Copeland, 680 S.W.2d 327, 330–31 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1984) (requiring probable cause for the results of blood tests). 
241 379 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 2004). 
242 Id. at 550 (emphasis in original). 
243 Id. 
244 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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arose not only because abortion is “a service grounded in a funda-
mental constitutional liberty,” but also because “all provision of med-
ical service in a private physicians’ offices carries with it a high expec-
tation of privacy for both physician and patient.”245  Thus, the court 
found that the clinics could not be considered closely regulated and 
the statute’s authorization of warrantless searches violated the Fourth 
Amendment.246 
V.  SPECIAL NEEDS 
The special needs exception to the warrant requirement extends 
the administrative search exception into the personal sphere, by 
permitting suspicionless searches of people, not just places.247  Where 
government can demonstrate a “special need,” searches of persons 
themselves, rather than places, have been held justifiable without in-
dividualized suspicion or a warrant.248  The special needs line of cases 
represents a shift not merely in focus, but in doctrine.249  Although 
the Court often asserts that “special needs” is a “closely guarded cate-
gory of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches,”250 the cas-
es make clear that suspicionless searches for special needs are no 
longer exceptional. 
The Supreme Court’s special needs cases most relevant here in-
volve testing a group of individuals for illegal drugs.251  The Court has 
upheld suspicionless drug testing when required pursuant to gov-
 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010).  Eve Brensike Primus traces the origins 
of the special needs doctrine from what she calls searches of “special subpopulations,” 
and argues that initially, courts required some generalized suspicion that members of a 
subpopulation violated a civil requirement, such as a condition of employment or school 
attendance.  Primus, supra note 215, at 260.  She distinguishes this special needs doctrine 
from that originating in the cases addressing administrative or dragnet searches, and ar-
gues that courts have conflated the two lines of cases, creating doctrinal confusion and 
inappropriately expanding the rationale for suspicionless searches.  Id. at 260–61. 
248 This is a far cry from the principle stated in Camara that “except in certain carefully de-
fined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is ‘unreasona-
ble’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.”  Camara v. Municipal Court 
of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528–29 (1967). 
249 Primus, supra note 215, at 260. 
250 See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997). 
251 Drug tests typically entail providing a urine sample (sometimes collected under supervi-
sion) that is tested by a laboratory for the presence of specified illegal drugs, such as co-
caine, heroin, marijuana, amphetamines, opiates, and barbiturates.  Drug tests may also 
include breathalyzer tests and blood tests. 
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ernment regulation,252 as a condition of government employment or 
promotion,253 and participation in public school activities.254  Initially, 
justification for testing was grounded in the fact that the persons test-
ed were in safety sensitive positions, who could endanger the public if 
impaired by drug use.  For example, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Execu-
tives Ass’n, federal regulations authorized drug testing of railroad em-
ployees after a serious accident, because impaired performance could 
cause injury to passengers.255  Findings of a special need to protect 
public safety, however, have decayed from reasonable to barely plau-
sible.  In Von Raab, applicants for positions in the Customs Service 
were required to pass a drug test on the theory that those who used 
drugs could mishandle firearms or be subjected to bribery or extor-
tion by drug dealers.256  A majority of Justices found this “special 
need” sufficient, even though it was speculative and not based on any 
suspicion of members of the applicant pool.257 
In Vernonia School District 47J, the Court’s majority concluded that 
the school district demonstrated a special need to test students in ath-
letic teams for drugs, because there were a few reports that athletes 
might have used marijuana and athletes were seen as role models for 
the rest of the student population.258  In Earls, however, it upheld 
drug testing for students in school organizations like choir, band, Ac-
ademic Team, Future Farmers, and Future Homemakers—groups 
that could hardly be classified as posing physical threats.  Earls em-
 
252 See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding drug testing of 
all railway employees involved in train accidents, when supervisors have evidence of drug 
or alcohol abuse among employees, and when links between impaired employees and ac-
cidents causing substantial personal injury and financial loss have been established). 
253 See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding drug 
testing of applicants for U.S. Custom Service jobs involving drug interdiction or the carry-
ing of a firearm). 
254 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 
(2002) (upholding drug testing of public school students who participate in any extracur-
ricular school activity, including choir, band, academic teams, Future Farmers of Ameri-
ca, and Future Homemakers of America); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 
(1995) (upholding random drug testing of students in a public school’s athletic teams, 
where there was some evidence of athletes leading a drug culture). 
255 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 608–11. 
256 Id. at 668–73 (“We think Customs employees who are directly involved in the interdiction 
of illegal drugs or who are required to carry firearms in the line of duty likewise have a 
diminished expectation of privacy in respect to the intrusions occasioned by a urine 
test.”). 
257 Id. at 669, 679. 
258 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 662–65; see also id. at 649 (“The high school football and 
wrestling coach witnessed a severe sternum injury suffered by a wrestler, and various 
omissions of safety procedures and misexecutions by football players, all attributable in 
his belief to the effects of drug use.”). 
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phasized that both decisions granted considerable leeway to school 
districts, based in part on their responsibility to protect the safety of 
students under their supervision.259  In her dissenting opinion, Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg challenged the factual basis for the majority’s 
conclusion, saying: 
Notwithstanding nightmarish images of out-of-control flatware, livestock 
run amok, and colliding tubas disturbing the peace and quiet of Tecum-
seh, the great majority of students the School District seeks to test in 
truth are engaged in activities that are not safety sensitive to an unusual 
degree.  There is a difference between imperfect tailoring and no tailor-
ing at all.260 
Nonetheless, the Court continues to insist that the special needs 
exception remains a “closely guarded category.”261  In Chandler v. Mil-
ler, the Court struck down a drug testing requirement for candidates 
for state political office, saying: 
Our precedents establish that the proffered special need for drug testing 
must be substantial—important enough to override the individual’s 
acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth 
Amendment’s normal requirement of individualized suspicion.262 
The drug testing cases, however, do not offer persuasive reasons for 
finding a substantial need for testing high school band members, but 
not candidates for office.  The risks these two groups pose, if any, are 
entirely different in scale. 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, dissenting in Chandler, disputed 
the notion that the special need must rise to the level of “important,” 
arguing that any “proper governmental purpose other than law en-
forcement” would qualify as a special need.263  Vernonia and Earls sug-
gest that the special needs analysis has collapsed into a rational basis 
test, permitting suspicionless searches for almost any legitimate gov-
ernment purpose, other than law enforcement.264 
 
259 Id. 
260 Earls, 536 U.S. at 852 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
261 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997) (“Georgia’s requirement that candidates for 
state office pass a drug test, we hold, does not fit within the closely guarded category of 
constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.”); see also City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 
U.S. 746, 760–61 (2010); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009). 
262 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.  The offices included “Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secre-
tary of State, Attorney General, State School Superintendent, Commissioner of Insur-
ance, Commissioner of Agriculture, Commissioner of Agriculture, Commissioner of La-
bor, Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the superior 
courts, district attorneys, members of the General Assembly, and members of the Public 
Service Commission.”  Id. at 309–10. 
263 Id. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
264 See generally SLOBOGIN, supra note 41; Maclin, supra note 220. 
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Nevertheless, the Court has not expressly conflated its Fourth 
Amendment standards with minimum scrutiny under its due process 
standards of review.  It continues to find that drug tests constitute 
searches when required by government.  The question in these cases 
is whether the search was both substantively and procedurally reason-
able when conducted without individualized suspicion or a warrant.265  
And the key factor in this line of cases has been the importance of 
the government’s purpose for a suspicionless search—whether drug 
testing is warranted by a special need.266 
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court found that the special 
need at issue must be the immediate purpose of the search, and not 
some speculative long-term goal that the search might help to achieve 
in the future.267  The Court rejected, as overreaching, the hospital’s 
argument that its goal was to help women and protect children: 
While the ultimate goal of the program may well have been to get the 
women in question into substance abuse treatment and off of drugs, the 
immediate objective of the searches was to generate evidence for law en-
forcement purposes in order to reach that goal. . . .  Because law enforce-
ment involvement always serves some broader social purpose or objective, 
under [hospital] respondent’s view, virtually any nonconsensual 
suspicionless search could be immunized under the special needs doc-
trine by defining the search solely in terms of its ultimate, rather than 
immediate, purpose.  Such an approach is inconsistent with the Fourth 
Amendment.268 
Several possible conclusions may be drawn from Ferguson.  The 
most obvious is that law enforcement does not qualify as a special 
need exception that excuses government from acting on individual-
ized suspicion, probable cause, or a warrant.269  A second possibility is 
that consent is necessary for a search that could reveal evidence of a 
crime and be reported to law enforcement.  This brings us back to 
 
265 The cases typically follow one of two paths from the Fourth Amendment’s two clauses—
those in which a warrantless search or seizure must be reasonable and those in which a 
warrant is required—although the reasoning in many cases appears somewhat overlap-
ping or inconsistent.  Whether the two clauses should legitimately be considered sepa-
rately and how to interpret them remains debatable.  See generally Solove, supra note 45. 
266 See, e.g., Chandler, 520 U.S. at 313–14. 
267 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83–84 (2001). 
268 Id. at 68, 84.  The Court also rejected law enforcement purposes as a special need in Indi-
anapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (overturning police program of suspicionless 
highway roadblocks to check vehicles for narcotics).  In Edmond, the Court said that the 
possibility that the roadblocks might also serve a public safety purpose by getting drunk 
drivers off the road did not qualify as an independent special need that could justify a 
suspicionless search.  Id. at 46. 
269 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84 (“[T]his case simply does not fit within the closely guarded cate-
gory of ‘special needs.’”). 
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the thorny question of whether consent to medical care is sufficient 
to allow a third party to report the results to the police, either volun-
tarily or under compulsion.270  The Supreme Court assumed lack of 
consent to both testing and reporting.271  The Fourth Circuit, on re-
mand, found no consent to testing or reporting for law enforcement 
purposes, without addressing consent to testing for medical care.272  
Thus, the question remains somewhat unresolved.  The case can then 
be seen as requiring consent to reporting only if the reports are in-
tended for law enforcement.  Would consent to reporting for a non-
law-enforcement purpose be required in addition to consent for or-
dinary medical care?  Ferguson offers a few hints, but no clear answer. 
The Court distinguished the facts in Ferguson from its earlier drug 
testing cases, as follows: 
In the previous four cases, there was no misunderstanding about the 
purpose of the test or the potential use of the test results, and there were 
protections against the dissemination of the results to third parties.  The 
use of an adverse test result to disqualify one from eligibility for a particu-
lar benefit, such as a promotion or an opportunity to participate in an 
extracurricular activity, involves a less serious intrusion on privacy than 
the unauthorized dissemination of such results to third parties.  The rea-
sonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic 
tests in a hospital is that the results of those tests will not be shared with non-
medical personnel without her consent.  In none of our prior cases was there 
any intrusion upon that kind of expectation.273 
This language suggests that the Court saw a difference in kind be-
tween drug testing of employees and students, on one hand, and 
drug testing of patients in a medical care setting, on the other.  More 
importantly, the Court seemed to link the testing with the reporting, 
saying that medical test results, even if part of the patient’s regular 
care, should not be disclosed outside the medical team without the 
patient’s consent.  The fact that the third-party doctrine was not even 
mentioned, not even to reject it, further suggests that it is not rele-
vant here.  It might not protect the state hospital from violating the 
 
270 See supra text accompanying notes 155–58; see also Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 
2010) (finding police request that hospital test patient’s blood for drugs, when patient 
had been tested only for rape treatment, violated Fourth Amendment). 
271 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85 n.24 (“But, as we have noted elsewhere, given the posture of the 
case, we must assume for purposes of decision that the patients did not consent to the 
searches, and we leave the question of consent for the Court of Appeals to determine.”). 
272 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 308 F.3d 380, 395 (4th Cir. 2002). 
273 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  An important fact in the 
prior drug testing cases was that no test results were allowed to be turned over to law en-
forcement authorities; they were used solely by the employer or school to determine eli-
gibility for continued employment or team membership.  Id. at 79. 
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Fourth Amendment by voluntarily reporting the test results to gov-
ernment officials. 
To be sure, the Court seemed to suggest that some uses of drug 
test results “involve[] a less serious intrusion on privacy.”274  It noted 
that a search without individualized suspicion may be reasonable 
when it serves an important government interest unrelated to law en-
forcement and the individual’s privacy interest is minimal.  However, 
the uses it referenced were confined to the supervisory entity—the 
employers and schools—who ordered the tests in the first place.275  It 
does not specifically address what special needs might justify sending 
test results to a government agency unrelated to law enforcement, 
such as a health or social services department. 
A third possible conclusion that can be drawn from Ferguson is that 
patients do have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their diagnos-
tic test results.  The Court was willing to accord more weight to a pa-
tient’s medical privacy interests than to other individual interests in 
privacy, at least those of employees and students.  The Court charac-
terized the invasion of privacy in Ferguson as “far more substantial” 
than in its other drug testing cases.276  Thus, it may be that the gov-
ernment must demonstrate more than a legitimate state interest to 
qualify for a special needs exception for medical information.  The 
decision rests heavily on the absence of what the Court in Chandler 
calls “any indication of a concrete danger demanding departure from 
the Fourth Amendment’s main rule” requiring individualized suspi-
cion.277  This suggests that the government’s “special need” must be to 
 
274 Id. at 78. 
275 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002), 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 
489 U.S 656 (1989), and Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) all mention 
a diminished expectation of privacy on the part of those tested, as a result of employment 
in a safety sensitive government position or attendance at a public school where school 
officials have responsibility for the students’ safety.  The Court also considered the pro-
cedural reasonableness of the testing policy, including whether the urine sample could 
be produced behind closed doors, the reliability of the testing laboratory, and the oppor-
tunity to check the test results with an independent second opinion. 
276 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78. 
277 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997).  One might argue that candidates for politi-
cal office would have a diminished expectation of privacy, yet the Court did not even 
mention that factor.  Instead, taking a cue from Justice Scalia’s dissent in Von Raab, the 
Court concluded (with only Chief Justice Rehnquist dissenting) that the testing primarily 
served a symbolic purpose, to assure the electorate that candidates for office would be 
free of the influence of drugs.  Id. at 321–22.  Such a purpose was clearly insufficient:  
“However well meant, the candidate drug test Georgia has devised diminishes personal 
privacy for a symbol’s sake.  The Fourth Amendment shields society against that state ac-
tion.”  Id. at 322. 
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prevent an identifiable, probably physical, harm, such as a train wreck 
or an injury to students, that could plausibly occur if someone under 
the influence of drugs were not excluded from participation.278  The 
Chandler Court concluded: 
[W]here the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket 
suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’—for 
example, searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and 
other official buildings.  But where, as in this case, public safety is not 
genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the 
suspicionless search, no matter how conveniently arranged.279 
If the special needs exception were limited to circumstances in 
which individuals pose a threat to public safety, then many reporting 
requirements could be challenged.280  Together, Ferguson and Chan-
dler suggest that the ultimate—and vague—goal of improving public 
health in general would not qualify as a special need that justifies a 
suspicionless search. 
Two recent lower court cases support this conclusion.  The Elev-
enth Circuit found that a Florida statute requiring suspicionless drug 
testing of all applicants as a condition of eligibility for Temporary As-
sistance for Needy Families (“TANF”) benefits violated the Fourth 
Amendment.281  The court concluded that the state failed to establish 
a special need to test all applicants without any suspicion.282  The state 
 
278 The Chandler decision emphasized that the testing requirement was “not needed and 
cannot work to ferret out lawbreakers,” because that goal could be accomplished with or-
dinary law enforcement methods, including warrants.  Id. at 320.  However, the Court was 
far more deferential to the schools in Vernonia and Earls, despite the lack of evidence of 
danger from drug use among students.  In Earls, the Court emphasized the school’s “cus-
todial and tutelary responsibility for children” as the primary legitimate basis for testing.  
536 U.S. at 830.  Such differences suggest an approach to drug testing that depends upon 
the Court’s view of the population targeted for testing.  See generally George M. Dery, III, 
Are Politicians More Deserving of Privacy Than Schoolchildren?  How Chandler v. Miller Exposed 
the Absurdities of Fourth Amendment ‘Special Needs’ Balancing, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 73 (1998). 
279 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323 (citation omitted).  In Von Raab, however, the Court stated that 
administrative searches are intended “to prevent the development of hazardous condi-
tions.”  489 U.S at 668.  Arguably, students who used drugs could pose some danger to 
their teammates and teachers during the academic year. 
280 One might even consider that the Justices would be sensitive to the fact that their own 
medical records would be reported under many reporting laws and scrutinize the need 
for the information as carefully as they did in Chandler. 
281 Lebron v. Sec’y of Fla. Dep’t of Children and Families, 772 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2014). 
282 Id. at 1364; see also Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1144 (E.D. Mich. 2000), 
aff’d, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 6893 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming by an equally divided en banc 
panel a district court decision enjoining a Michigan statute that authorized the 
suspicionless drug testing of welfare recipients).  The state then settled the case by agree-
ing to test only recipients who were reasonably suspected of using drugs.  Press Release, 
ACLU, Settlement Reached in ACLU Lawsuit Over Mandatory Drug Testing of Welfare Recipients 
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claimed that drug testing was needed to ensure that (1) beneficiaries 
meet job readiness goals, (2) TANF meets child-welfare and family-
stability goals, and (3) public funds are not used to undermine public 
health.283  The court disagreed.  It found that, while these were “un-
questionably legitimate” public concerns, “these needs are not specif-
ic to or special for TANF applicants, nor is drug testing essential to 
ensuring the success of the TANF program as a whole.”284  Moreover, 
they are “general concerns, proffered only at a high level of abstrac-
tion and without empirical evidence, and thus do not justify an ex-
ception to the Fourth Amendment.”285 
The court required a “substantial” special need—a purpose “im-
portant enough to override the individual’s acknowledged privacy in-
terest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment’s normal 
requirement of individualized suspicion.”286  Moreover, the state had 
the burden of demonstrating a special need before the court needed 
to balance that need against the privacy interest at stake.287 
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Florida’s alternative claim that 
applicants consented to the tests.  Specifically, the court confirmed 
that the state cannot conduct unconstitutional drug tests “indirectly 
by conditioning the receipt of this government benefit on the appli-
cant’s forced waiver of his Fourth Amendment right.”288  The fact that 
the test was required as a condition of TANF benefits rendered it in-
voluntary and, therefore, not a valid consent.  Such a required “con-
sent” does not render a search reasonable for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment.289  Perhaps more importantly, the court made clear its 
view that consent is not an independent justification for a special 
needs search.  Rather, when a government benefit is conditioned on 
 
(Dec. 18, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/news/settlement-reached-aclu-michigan-lawsuit-
over-mandatory-drug-testing-welfare-recipients. 
283 Lebron, 772 F.3d at 1359, 1364; see generally Brianna W. McLaughlin, Drug Testing, Welfare, 
and the Special Needs Doctrine:  An Argument in Support of Drug Testing TANF Recipients, 61 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 567 (2013) (arguing for suspicionless testing of all TANF applicants to 
protect children and save the state money). 
284 Lebron, 772 F.3d at 1364. 
285 Id.  The court found that the state’s interests apply generally to everyone in the state, not 
only TANF applicants, but then noted that “the State does not—and cannot—claim an 
entitlement to drug test all parents of all children.”  Id. 
286 Id. at 1364 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997)). 
287 Id.; see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985). 
288 Lebron, 772 F.3d at 1374; accord Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. Council 79 v. 
Scott, 717 F.3d 851, 873 (11th Cir. 2013) (“In effect, the State is offering its employees 
this Hobson’s choice:  either they relinquish their Fourth Amendment rights and pro-
duce a urine sample which carries the potential for termination, or they accept termina-
tion immediately.”). 
289 Lebron, 772 F.3d at 1375; Scott, 717 F.3d at 875. 
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consent to drug testing, “the unconstitutional conditions inquiry is 
baked into the special needs analysis.”290  Instead, the degree of vol-
untariness of any consent goes to the level of the person’s expecta-
tion of privacy in the special needs analysis. 
Of course, these special needs cases all concern requiring a per-
son to take a drug test, whereas reporting laws simply require third 
parties to turn over the person’s test results or other medical infor-
mation to government.  A district court decision that may offer some 
insight into mandatory reporting laws is Oregon Prescription Drug Moni-
toring Program v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.291  Oregon creat-
ed a PDMP to help physicians and pharmacists identify drugs their 
patients use for purposes of recognizing drug interactions and drug-
seeking behavior.292  The state statute barred disclosures to federal, 
state, and local law enforcement agencies unless they were made 
“[p]ursuant to a valid court order based on probable cause” in an au-
thorized drug-related investigation involving a person whose infor-
mation is requested.293  The state sought declaratory judgment that 
the Oregon statute precluded the federal Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration (“DEA”) from demanding PDMP data without a court order. 
The DEA had repeatedly served the PDMP with administrative sub-
poenas seeking data about individuals, asserting that the Controlled 
Substances Act authorizes it to obtain such information by subpoena 
alone and preempts the Oregon law.294  Importantly, the DEA relied 
on the third-party doctrine to argue that patients have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their information submitted to the PDMP.295 
The district court held that the patients whose data was in the 
PDMP and physicians who used the PDMP for medical purposes had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their prescription infor-
mation.296  Given this “heightened privacy interest,” the court found 
that demanding the data by issuing administrative subpoenas would 
be an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.297  
The third-party doctrine did not apply here, said the court, because 
“patients and doctors are not voluntarily conveying information to 
the PDMP,” and the PDMP records are “more inherently personal or 
 
290 Lebron, 772 F. 3d at 1376. 
291 998 F. Supp. 2d 957 (D. Or. 2014). 
292 Id. at 959–60 (noting that the PDMP recorded prescriptions for Schedules II-IV drugs 
under the federal Controlled Substances Act). 
293 Id. at 960 (quoting Or. Rev. Stat. § 431.964, § 431.966). 
294 Id. at 961; see also 21 U.S.C. § 876. 
295 Or. Prescription Drug Program, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 966. 
296 Id. at 964, 966. 
297 Id. at 967. 
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private” than the business records at issue in Miller and Smith v. Mary-
land.298  Accordingly, the DEA would be required to obtain a court 
order to obtain specific PDMP records. 
VI.  THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS 
We turn now to conceptions of reasonable expectations of privacy 
in personal medical information that might warrant due process pro-
tection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. State mandato-
ry reporting laws have rarely received judicial review.  The few United 
States Supreme Court decisions touching the subject have granted 
substantial, but not unlimited, deference to state legislatures to com-
pel reporting of prescriptions for controlled substances (with patient 
names) to deter and investigate drug crimes, and to report cases of 
abortion (without patient names) for maternal health research and 
statistical summaries. 
Whalen v. Roe, decided in 1977, might be considered a founda-
tional case in this area.299  Whalen has been cited for the proposition 
that the state can collect identifiable medical information for legiti-
mate purposes, using something akin to minimum scrutiny.300  It has 
also been cited as recognizing or at least indicating that a person has 
a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in his or her medi-
cal information.301  Neither of these propositions completely captures 
the nuances in Whalen’s facts or opinion.  Like Miller, Whalen offers 
less guidance for contemporary data collection and use than might 
be assumed. 
Whalen upheld a New York state law requiring pharmacies to send 
a copy of every prescription for Schedule II drugs to the state health 
 
298 Id. (citing United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 689 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 
2012)).  But see State v. Wiedeman, 835 N.W.2d 698 (Neb. 2013) (upholding law en-
forcement search of a patient’s prescription records at pharmacies because patient had 
no ownership or possessory interest in records); Williams v. Kentucky, 213 S.W.3d 671, 
683–84 (Ky. 2006) (upholding Kentucky All-Schedule Prescription Electronic Reporting 
program as facially constitutional). 
299 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
300 See e.g., Act-Up Triangle v. Com’n for Health Serv., 483 S.E.2d 388, 395 (N.C. 1997) (up-
holding an AIDS reporting law that enforced the confidentiality of medical records with 
criminal and civil penalties); Stone v. Stow, 64 Ohio St. 3d 156, 166, 593 N.E.2d 294, 301 
(Ohio 1992) (citing Whalen for proposition that privacy in prescription records is limited 
to prohibiting disclosure to the public). 
301 See, e.g., Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 756–57 (2011); Big 
Ridge, Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety and Health Review Comm., 715 F.3d 631, 648 (7th Cir. 
2013); Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dep’t, 578 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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department.302 The prescriptions, which included the patient’s name, 
address, and age, were used to identify unlawful drug prescribing and 
dispensing and unlawful drug diversion.303  Patients and physicians 
challenged the statute, claiming a right to privacy grounded in both 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments (through the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 304 
The Court did not discuss the Fourth Amendment, relegating the 
issue to a footnote.  There it rejected the challengers’ reliance on 
Katz v. United States305 and Terry v. Ohio,306 saying, “those cases involve 
affirmative, unannounced, narrowly focused intrusions into individu-
al privacy during the course of criminal investigations.  We have nev-
er carried the Fourth Amendment’s interest in Privacy as far as the 
[Whalen] appellees would have us. We decline to do so now.”307  The 
Court’s decision in Miller, decided the year before, must have been 
fresh in the Justice’s minds.  Still, the Court’s footnote is puzzling, 
since the prescription data were intended to be used to discover and 
initiate investigations of drug-related criminal offenses, as well as vio-
lations of medical or pharmacy licensure.  In this respect, they were 
somewhat similar to administrative searches to which the Fourth 
Amendment does apply.  Perhaps the real distinction lay in the fact 
that the prescriptions were collected as an ongoing program, rather 
than a single, “narrowly focused intrusion.” 
The challengers objected to (1) the state’s initial collection of 
their identifying information, as well as (2) the possibility that their 
information would be exposed to others.  The Court recognized both 
claims, but focused on the latter.  It framed the claim under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, primarily as “the individual interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters,” which it distinguished from 
the “interest in independence in making certain kinds of important 
decisions.”308 
 
302 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. 
303 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 593.  The state sought to prevent patients from stealing prescriptions 
or obtaining drugs from multiple physicians, pharmacists from improperly refilling pre-
scriptions, and physicians from overprescribing.  Id. at 592. 
304 Id. at 598. 
305 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
306 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
307 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 604 n.32. 
308 Id. at 599–600.  The latter reference was to the right to privacy that includes the right to 
make decisions about marriage, contraception and abortion.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 
1 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 497 (1965).  The Court had decided Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) only four years earlier.  With the contours of this right to pri-
vacy still being developed, the Court had little precedent to rely on.  Later, in the abor-
tion reporting cases, the Court seemed to find both aspects of privacy at issue, since man-
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The Court’s reasons for finding no Fourteenth Amendment viola-
tion in Whalen may not tell us much about the validity of modern 
mandatory reporting laws.  First, the Court found that the state pro-
tected the confidentiality of the data by keeping them on magnetic 
tapes in an offline computer in a locked room and limiting the num-
ber of people authorized to access the data.309  That is not a realistic 
option today.  Computing has changed dramatically since 1977.  
Mandatory reports are increasingly sent to health departments elec-
tronically through a secure internet portal.  Still, breaches remain a 
worry.310  In addition, today’s data are made available to multiple 
third parties for various uses.311  Indeed, that is the purpose of creat-
ing many databases. 
Second, the Court analogized the prescription law to laws requir-
ing the reporting of venereal disease, child abuse, and deadly weapon 
wounds.312  The first example enables an early response to an imme-
diate threat to other people.  The latter two are related to investigat-
ing possible criminal offenses.  The number of reporting laws has in-
creased significantly since 1977.  Most of these collect data not for 
such immediate uses, but for future analysis and research.  It is un-
likely that the Court considered the extent to which future laws 
would sweep up data for far less immediate purposes. 
Third, the prescription reporting law in Whalen can be viewed as 
adding a mechanism for enforcing the state’s criminal laws against 
unlawful prescribing and unlawful drug use, even if the forms were 
 
datory reporting of abortion information could chill the exercise of the right to decide to 
have an abortion.  Perhaps for that reason, the Court approved reporting laws that did 
not include the patient’s name.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
900–01 (1992); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747, 765–68 (1986); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. 
Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80–81 (1976). 
309 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605–07 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The central storage and easy 
accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential for abuse of that infor-
mation, and I am not prepared to say that future developments will not demonstrate the 
necessity of some curb on such technology.”). 
310 See, e.g., Robert Hackett, Massive Federal Data Breach Affects 7% of Americans, TIME.COM (Ju-
ly 9, 2015), http://time.com/3952071/opm-data-breach-federal-employees/; U.S. Dep’t 
of Health and Human Servs. Data breach results in $4.8 million HIPAA settlements, HHS Press 
Office (May 7, 2014), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/05/20140507b.html; 
U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., WellPoint Pays HHS $1.7 Million for Leaving Infor-
mation Accessible over Internet, HHS Press Office (July 11, 2013), http:/ /www.hhs.gov/
news/press/2013pres/07/20130711b.html; see also U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Ser-
vices, Office for Civil Rights, Breach Portal:  Notice to the Secretary of HHS Breach of Unsecured 
Protected Health Information, https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breach_report.jsf. 
311 See supra Part II. 
312 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602 n.29. 
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sent to the health department.313  If so, this would suggest that the 
Fourteenth Amendment permits collecting data without individual-
ized suspicion for the purpose of future criminal investigations.  The 
special needs line of cases under the Fourth Amendment, however, 
rejects suspicionless searches for law enforcement purposes.314  The 
Whalen Court dismissed the application of the Fourth Amendment,315 
but was writing decades before it decided the special needs, drug test-
ing cases like Ferguson and Earls. 
One distinction between these seemingly inconsistent decisions is 
that the prescriptions in Whalen could be used for a few civil purpos-
es, such as medical licensure disciplinary actions, as well as criminal 
investigations.  However, the New York law was enacted in response to 
a perceived increase in drug crime316 and was intended to prevent 
criminal offenses.  Thus, another possibility is that the Court was re-
luctant to strike down a new initiative to attack the drug problem.  
But the later drug testing programs in Ferguson, Chandler, Vernonia 
and other cases were also new initiatives to prevent drug use.  About 
the only real distinction is that the drug testing cases involved an im-
mediate response from the entity conducting the tests, whereas the 
New York law compiled a database for future use.  That is not much 
of a difference.  It may simply be that the Court was just beginning to 
consider whether the Constitution offered any protection from gov-
ernment compelled data collection and was wary of opening the door 
to a broad principle of privacy. 
The Supreme Court has had few opportunities to explain its rea-
soning.  Only a handful of cases concerning health data collection 
reached the Court after Whalen.  All those involved laws requiring 
physicians or hospitals to report medical information about abortions 
to the health department.317  These cases, too, offer little guidance for 
analyzing modern reporting laws.  First, the reporting requirement 
was a relatively minor issue in cases that challenged restrictions on a 
 
313 Id. at 603 n.30 (noting that it is “well settled that the State has broad police powers in 
regulating the administration of drugs by the health professions”); see also State v. Russo, 
790 A.2d 1132, 1157 (Conn. 2002) cert denied 537 U.S. 879 (2002) (describing Whalen as 
not distinguishing between law enforcement and health department access to prescrip-
tion records and recognizing that the New York law was passed “to prevent criminal mis-
conduct” (emphasis in original)). 
314 See supra Part V. 
315 See supra text accompanying note 307. 
316 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591–92. 
317 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 900–01 (1992); Thorn-
burgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 765–68 (1986); 
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 
U.S. 52, 80-81 (1976). 
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woman’s right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy and, ac-
cordingly, received little analysis.  Second, while the Court recog-
nized a right to privacy, it did not always distinguish between infor-
mation privacy and the liberty interest in making decisions about 
abortion. 
In Danforth, the Court upheld a Missouri statute requiring abor-
tion data reporting for the purpose of preserving “maternal health 
and life by adding to the sum of medical knowledge through the 
compilation of relevant maternal and health and life data and to 
monitor all abortions performed to assure that they are done only 
under and in accordance with the provisions of the law.”318  It con-
cluded, “Recordkeeping and reporting requirements that are reason-
ably directed to the preservation of maternal health and that properly 
respect a patient’s confidentiality and privacy are permissible.”319  
What counts as proper respect for privacy was not explained.  The 
statute did not expressly require the patients’ names or other identi-
fying information, and it limited use to “statistical purposes.”  The 
Court noted that the requirements were “perhaps approaching im-
permissible limits,” but were “not constitutionally offensive in them-
selves,” as long as they were not “abused or overdone.”320 
In contrast, the Court struck down a Pennsylvania statute that did 
exceed permissible limits.  The law required detailed information 
about abortion patients, including age, race, marital status, political 
subdivision, payment method, number of prior pregnancies and ges-
tational age, and also allowed abortion records to be “open to public 
inspection and copying.”321  The Court found that three of the law’s 
characteristics “belie[d] any assertions . . . that [the state] is advanc-
ing any legitimate interest.”322  These were the “scope of information 
required,” despite the fact that names were not required, “its availa-
bility to the public,” and the lack of limitations on how the infor-
mation could be used.323 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, however, 
the plurality opinion seemed to favor data collection for the purpose 
 
318 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 81. 
319 Id. at 80. 
320 Id. at 81. 
321 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 765–68. 
322 Id. at 765. 
323 Id.; see also id. at 766–67 (“Although the statute does not specifically require the reporting 
of the woman’s name, the amount of information about her and the circumstances under 
which she had an abortion are so detailed that identification is likely. . . . The ‘impermis-
sible limits’ that Danforth mentioned and that Missouri approached have been exceeded 
here.”). 
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of medical research:  “The collection of information with respect to 
actual patients is a vital element of medical research.”324  The statute 
required reporting the physician, the facility, the referring physician 
or agency, the woman’s age (but not her name), the number of prior 
pregnancies and abortions, gestational age, type of abortion proce-
dure, date of abortion, any preexisting medical conditions that could 
complicate abortion, the basis for deciding whether the abortion was 
medically necessary, if relevant, weight of the aborted fetus, and 
whether the woman was married.  In the Court’s view, the data to be 
reported did not pose a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice.325 
The Court’s focus in the abortion decisions appears to be whether 
the disclosure of information would chill the exercise of a constitu-
tional right by “requiring disclosure of protected, but sometimes un-
popular, activities.”326  Thus, the Court paid close attention to wheth-
er a woman could be identified from the reported information. 
Lower courts, however, have recognized a more specific constitu-
tional right to privacy in one’s personal medical information.327  In 
Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, for example, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals specifically addressed information privacy separately from 
the right to decide to have an abortion and also from a Fourth 
Amendment claim.328  It struck down state law provisions requiring 
abortion providers to allow health department personnel access to 
patient medical records (including names and addresses) and to give 
fetal ultrasound prints to private contractors as violations of the pa-
tients’ right to information privacy.329  Earlier, the Ninth Circuit had 
held that the right to informational privacy “applies both when an 
individual chooses not to disclose highly sensitive information to the 
government and when an individual seeks assurance that such infor-
mation will not be made public.”330  In Tucson Woman’s Clinic, the 
court said, “Even if a law adequately protects against public disclosure 
of a patient’s private information, it may still violate informational 
 
324 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 900–01 (1992). 
325 The Court nevertheless struck down the requirement to report the woman’s reason for 
not notifying her husband as an undue burden, because its opinion also invalidated the 
statute’s provision compelling married women to notify their husbands as an undue bur-
den on a woman’s right to choose.  Id. at 901. 
326 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 747; see also MARINER & ANNAS, supra note 33, at 438. 
327 State constitutions also protect privacy, often more explicitly than the federal constitu-
tion.  See, e.g., Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 641 (Cal. 1994) (medi-
cal records). 
328 Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 371 F.3d 1173, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004). 
329 Id. 
330 Planned Parenthood v. Lawall (Lawal II), 307 F.3d 783, 798–90 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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privacy rights if an unbounded, large number of government em-
ployees have access to the information.”331  The court found that the 
state had little, if any, need for much of the information sought; most 
of the information bore no relation to patient health or safety. 
Outside the context of mandatory reporting laws, federal courts of 
appeal have recognized Fourteenth Amendment protection for a 
person’s privacy interest in personal medical information and from 
involuntary disclosure to state and federal agencies.332  Many of these 
 
331 Tucson Woman’s Clinic, 371 F.3d at 1193 (emphasis in original). 
332 See Moore v. Prevo, 379 F. App’x 425, 428 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that prisoners have a 
“Fourteenth Amendment privacy interest in guarding against disclosure of sensitive med-
ical information from other inmates”); O’Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 201 (2d Cir. 
2005) (psychiatric records); Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 315 (3d Cir. 2001) (inmate’s HIV 
status); Livsey v. Salt Lake Cnty., 275 F.3d 952, 956 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that if infor-
mation is “highly personal or intimate,” like sexual medical information, an individual’s 
expectation of privacy is legitimate); Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (sexual orientation); Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 302–03 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(minor student’s pregnancy status); Denuis v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 956 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(“[T]he right clearly covers medical records and communications.”); Herring v. Keenan, 
218 F.3d 1171, 1175 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 96 (2001) (medical infor-
mation); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The right not to have in-
timate facts concerning one’s life disclosed without one’s consent” is “a venerable [right] 
whose constitutional significance we have recognized in the past.”) (citing Paul P. v. 
Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 401–02 (3d Cir. 1999)); Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 111 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (transexualism); Doe v. Se. Pa. Trans. Auth. (SEPTA), 72 F.3d 1133, 1137 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (public employee’s “medical prescription record is . . . protected by the Consti-
tution”); Anderson v. Romero, 72 F. 3d 518, 522 (7th Cir. 1995); Doe v. City of New York, 
15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Individuals who are infected with the HIV virus clearly 
possess a constitutional right to privacy regarding their condition.”); Lankford v. City of 
Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 479 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding that “an employee’s medical records, 
which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of mate-
rials entitled to privacy protection” (citations omitted)); A.L.A. v. West Valley City, 26 
F.3d 989, 990 (10th Cir. 1994) (“There is no dispute that confidential medical infor-
mation is entitled to constitutional privacy protection.”); Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d 
1348, 1351 (8th Cir. 1993) (concerning “highly personal medical and financial infor-
mation”); Watson v. Lowcountry Red Cross, 974 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1992); Walls v. City of 
Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 194 (4th Cir. 1990); Schaill v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Sch. Corp., 864 
F.2d 1309, 1322 n.19 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding “a substantial privacy interest in the confi-
dentiality of medical information”); Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 812 
F.2d 105, 112–13 (3d Cir. 1987) (“The more intimate or personal the information, the 
more justified is the expectation that it will not be subject to public scrutiny.” involving a 
police investigator’s medical, financial and behavioral information); In re Search Warrant 
(Sealed), 810 F.2d 67, 71 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987) (medical rec-
ords); Trade Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, Inc. v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 1985) (per-
sonal medical history protected from random government intrusion); Taylor v. Best, 746 
F.2d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 982 (1985); United States v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that NIOSH could compel pro-
duction of employee medical records from private corporation for investigation of em-
ployee complaints and listing criteria for disclosure); Schachter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35, 
37 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding a constitutionally protected “interest in avoiding disclosure of 
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have required heightened scrutiny of laws that provide access to 
health or sexual information.333  However, the cases do not necessarily 
offer a coherent, overall conception of expectations of health infor-
mation privacy.  Rather, many appear to consider the sensitivity of 
specific information requests on a case-by-case basis.334  Mark Roth-
stein has argued that a few courts appear to be narrowing constitu-
tional due process protection for medical information privacy.335  In 
Matson v. Board of Education, for example, a majority of judges found 
no constitutional protection without a showing of “societal discrimi-
nation and intolerance against those suffering from” a particular dis-
ease—fibromyalgia.336  This places a substantial burden on individu-
als, whose primary injury is often the dignitary harm of disclosure 
itself. 
VII.  TOWARD A MORE NUANCED VIEW OF REPORTING LAWS 
The foregoing suggests that while most health-reporting laws sub-
jected to constitutional challenge have been upheld, the cases ad-
dressing constitutional questions are limited both in number and rel-
evance.  These quasi-precedents do not fit all of today’s diverse 
reporting laws.  Data are sought for many different purposes—some 
essential, others perhaps not.  Constitutional doctrines should take 
 
personal matters”); Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (prison in-
mate had a constitutionally protected privacy interest in his medical records and positive 
HIV test, implicating sensitive information about sexual activity and drug use).  But see 
Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 481 (6th Cir. 1999) (refusing to extend Whalen v. 
Roe beyond its facts in the absence of specific language in the Constitution defining the 
right); Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994) (same); American Fed’n of 
Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(doubting a constitutional right of information privacy); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 
1090 (6th Cir. 1981) (same). 
333 See Sheets v. Salt Lake City, 45 F.3d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir. 1995) (requiring a compelling 
state interest require disclosure of sexual or health information); Walls v. Petersburg, 895 
F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The more intimate or personal the information, the more 
justified is the expectation that it will not be subject to public scrutiny.”); Fraternal Order 
of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that most cir-
cuits apply an “intermediate standard of review” for most confidentiality violations and 
strict scrutiny for “severe intrusions on confidentiality”). 
334 For example, courts have allowed disclosure of prison inmates’ HIV status to prison 
guards to protect the prison population in the context of diminished expectations of pri-
vacy in the institution.  See, e.g., Anderson, 72 F.3d at 523; Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 
1501 (11th Cir. 1991). 
335 Mark A. Rothstein, Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy in Critical Condition, 39 J. L. 
MED. & ETHICS 280, 280–81 (2011). 
336 Matson v. Bd. of. Educ., City Sch. Dist. of N.Y., 631 F.3d 57, 67 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding no 
violation of any constitutional right to privacy as a result of public disclosure of public 
school teacher’s fibromyalgia). 
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the differences into account when determining the scope of privacy 
and justifiable government uses of identifiable data for civil purposes. 
Interpretations of the human right to privacy do take such differ-
ences into account.  For this reason, they may offer standards against 
which to evaluate the merits of diverse reporting laws.337  First, as the 
High Commissioner’s Report on Privacy makes clear, the human right 
to privacy embodies the core principles of legality, necessity, and 
proportionality.338  State interference with an individual’s “privacy, 
family, home or correspondence”339 must first be lawful, in the sense 
of duly authorized by legitimate institutions.  But, proper authoriza-
tion does not save a law from being arbitrary and therefore in viola-
tion of the Covenant.340  The Human Rights Committee explains that 
to avoid arbitrariness, laws must be “in accordance with the provi-
sions, aims and objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any 
event, reasonable in the particular circumstance.”341  Thus, just as U.S. 
laws must not violate constitutional rights, laws in States party to the 
Convention, including the United States, are bound not to contra-
vene the human rights protected by the Convention. 
The concept of necessity refers to the State’s justification for ob-
taining identifiable information:  “public authorities should only be 
able to call for such information relating to an individual’s private life 
the knowledge of which is essential in the interests of society as un-
derstood under the Covenant.”342  This suggests a level of justification 
that exceeds what might count as a legitimate state interest for due 
process purposes.  It is buttressed by the proportionality (or reasona-
bleness) requirement, which implies that “any interference with pri-
vacy must be proportional to the end sought and be necessary in the 
 
337 Although limited to criminal laws, the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS (3d ed. 2013) 
might also serve as a partial model for government access to records for civil purposes.  
The Standards categorize information held by institutional third parties as “highly pri-
vate, moderately private, minimally private, or not private,” with the level of protection 
decreasing protection with the degree of privacy.  Id. at 19.  The Standards also recognize 
the ubiquity of data disclosure to third parties today.  Accordingly, they recommend that 
legislative authorizations to access data consider, inter alia, “the extent to which (a) the in-
itial transfer of such information to an institutional third party is reasonably necessary to 
participate meaningfully in society or in commerce, or is socially beneficial.”  Id. at 20. 
338 OHCHR, Right to Privacy, supra note 14, at 49. 
339 Id. at 55. 
340 Human Rights Committee, supra note 20, at para. 3. 
341 Id. at para. 4. 
342 Id. at para. 7. 
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circumstances of any given case.”343  These principles recognize that 
privacy is not a one-dimensional right, but contains components of 
varying sensitivity and importance.  The case-specific focus also calls 
for tailoring demands for identifiable information to the importance 
of the government’s need. 
The Human Rights Committee also requires States to take 
“[e]ffective measures . . . to ensure that information concerning a 
person’s private life does not reach the hands of persons who are not 
authorized by law to receive, process and use it, and is never used for 
purposes incompatible with the Covenant.”344  This is consistent with 
an admonition to limit custody and use of the information collected 
to those with specific authority to do so.  It may limit the extent to 
which identifiable data in a government database can be disclosed to 
third parties for different uses than that for which it was originally 
collected. 
U.S. cases discussing due process protection of privacy tend to use 
a balancing test that weighs the purpose of data collection against the 
intrusion on a person’s privacy.  While the concept of balancing 
might fit the human rights framework, both sides of the scale are of-
ten stated in frustratingly general terms in U.S. case law.345  Purposes 
are often briefly described as broad societal goals like reducing drug 
abuse346 or medical research.347  No one would argue with such noble 
aspirations.  Yet, such goals fail to meaningfully explain the real pur-
pose for which data will be used and why the data are needed.348  This 
makes it difficult to assess the weight of the state’s interest.  The con-
nection between data collection and these general goals is often 
speculative and far in the future.  For example, APCDs hope to use 
 
343 Human Rights Committee, 50th Sess., Commc’n No. 488/1992:  Australia 04/04/94, 
CPR/C/50/D/488/1992, at 9 (Mar. 31, 1994),  http: //www1.chr.up.ac.za/undp/other/
docs/caselaw15.pdf. 
344 Human Rights Committee, supra note 20, at para. 10. 
345 See Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 106–
07 (1992) (describing how Supreme Court Justices “exaggerate the state’s interests [and] 
trivialize the individual’s interests”). 
346 See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 606 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The Court 
recognizes that an individual’s interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters is an as-
pect of the right of privacy . . . but holds that in this case, any such interest has not been 
seriously enough invaded by the State to require a showing that its program was indispen-
sable to the State’s effort to control drug abuse.” (citations omitted)). 
347 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79 (1976) (“The stat-
ute states that the information on the forms ‘shall be confidential and shall be used only 
for statistical purposes.’  The ‘records, however, may be inspected and health data ac-
quired by local, state, or national public health officers.’”) 
348 Mariner, supra note 73, at 383–84. 
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insurance claims data to analyze the costs and outcomes of multiple 
medical services in order to see which are cost-effective.  At some fu-
ture time, after detailed studies, a government agency or private in-
surer might (or might not) use the study results to alter payment 
rates.  An alteration might (or might not) reduce overall health care 
costs.  At the time of data collection, such results are aspirational and 
all too often speculative. 
Different problems confront the other side of the scale—
intrusions on privacy.  There may be little consensus on whether the 
data sought should be considered an aspect of a person’s privacy at 
all.  Do people reasonably expect the information to be kept private, 
and is this expectation socially acceptable?  If so, the inquiry proceeds 
to ask whether requiring disclosure to government would cause the 
individual measurable harm.  In contrast to definitions of purpose, 
privacy harms are often required to be concrete and imminent.349 
Dignitary harms from being required to reveal identifiable infor-
mation are rarely considered.350 
Paradoxically perhaps, several scholars argue that there may be 
room for a more nuanced standards governing the collection of data 
from third parties under the Fourth Amendment than under Fifth 
Amendment due process doctrine.351 Traditionally, mandatory report-
ing laws have been slotted into one or more of the exceptions to the 
Fourth Amendment’s requirement of probable cause, warrants, or 
consent. When closely examined, however, that classification may not 
hold for some contemporary reporting laws.  Furthermore, the possi-
bility that the Supreme Court might begin to apply a mosaic theory352 
to define searches suggests that it may become plausible to bring 
some civil reporting laws under the Fourth Amendment’s protection. 
 
349 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600–04 (“We hold that neither the immediate nor the threatened 
impact of the patient-identification requirements in the New York State Controlled Sub-
stances Act of 1972 on either the reputation or the independence of patients for whom 
Schedule II drugs are medically indicated is sufficient to constitute an invasion of any 
right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also Mariner, supra note 
73, at 377–81. 
350 But see Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004) (considering how wom-
en would feel if their abortion records or photos of their torsos were made publicly avail-
able even without identification). 
351 See Henderson, supra note 146. 
352 See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012); 
see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 956 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (determining whether government behavior constitutes a 
search requires considering “whether people reasonably expect that their movements will 
be recorded and aggregated” in such a manner). 
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The Supreme Court has grounded its conceptions of Fourth 
Amendment privacy in various ways, often using a property or 
boundary-based theory of privacy, while at other times expressing a 
reasonable expectations of privacy theory.353  The property-based the-
ory asks whether police (typically) have crossed over from public to 
private property, such as a house.354  The reasonable expectations 
theory asks whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in something, such as the contents of a telephone call355 or a suit-
case,356 even when the telephone or suitcase is in a public place.357  
While the Jones decision appeared to rely on a property-based theory 
of trespass,358 Riley was concerned with the expectation of privacy in 
cell phone content.359  The variation in rationales in these cases sug-
gests that the Court looks not merely to a single action on the part of 
government, such as viewing cell phone contents, but also considers 
the government’s reason for seeking the information and the degree 
to which the information sought deserves constitutional protection. 
Changes in Fourth Amendment doctrine would require finding 
that government demands for information from third parties consti-
tute a search, determining whether the search requires a warrant, 
and if not, whether it is reasonable without a warrant.360  The first is-
sue entails express recognition that the third-party doctrine does not 
apply as a blanket exception.  The second and third issues are likely 
 
353 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 
143 (1978). 
354 See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 
27 (2001). 
355 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
356 See, e.g., Bond v. U.S., 529 U.S. 334 (2000) (tactile examination of bus passenger’s luggage 
in overhead storage violated the Fourth Amendment).  For a deeper analysis of Fourth 
Amendment protections for luggage see generally Jason W. Eldridge, The Fourth Amend-
ment:  The Privacy of Overhead Luggage Compartments on Commercial Buses, 27 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 2003 (2001). 
357 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (arguing that “the Fourth Amendment protects people not plac-
es”). 
358 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951 n.5. 
359 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (“These cases require us to decide 
how the search incident to arrest doctrine applies to modern cell phones . . . .”); United 
States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1216 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in cell phone site location information whose exposure “can convert what would 
otherwise be a private event into a public one”); see also Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 
N.E.3d 846 (Mass. 2014) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone data; 
third-party doctrine did not apply; warrant required). 
360 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013) (“Even if a warrant is not required, a 
search is not beyond Fourth Amendment scrutiny; for it must be reasonable in its scope 
and manner of execution.”). 
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to be fact specific.361  They would depend on both the nature of the 
information sought (to evaluate its privacy quotient) and the reason 
for seeking it.362  Such factual variations, however, should not pose in-
surmountable obstacles for the judiciary when applied to reporting 
laws.  Unlike cases involving criminal investigations of individuals, re-
porting laws offer a single reason (or state interest) for collecting a 
particular category of information.  Thus, there is no need to address 
individual variations.  Each law can be analyzed in categorical 
terms.363 
Even in the absence of formal doctrinal change, some Fourth 
Amendment cases use reasoning parallel to that used in due process 
analyses—assessing whether government has a legitimate reason for 
obtaining personal information that qualifies as private.364  Thus, 
courts have already demonstrated their capacity to perform the req-
uisite analysis. 
This does raise the question whether the tests for Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment purposes are or should be considered the same or even 
duplicative?  Is there any meaningful difference between a due pro-
cess justification and a special need for information?  If there are 
none, then perhaps granting Fourth Amendment protection to 
health information held by third parties gains nothing for those who 
seek more privacy protection. 
 
361 Kerr argues for retaining a blanket third-party doctrine in order to avoid fact-specific 
queries that complicate law enforcement decision-making.  See generally Kerr, supra note 
102. 
362 See generally SOLOVE, supra note 30 (arguing for variation in privacy protections depending 
on the type of information, its intended use, and the risk of different harms). 
363 One might argue that the categorical nature of civil reporting laws makes data collection 
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, because uniform reporting 
requirements limit government discretion and opportunities for abuse, such as targeting 
disfavored individuals.  See generally Stephen E. Henderson, Fourth Amendment Time Ma-
chines (and What They Might Say About Police Body Cameras), 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 933 
(2016).  The legislature can duly weigh the importance of the government interest 
against reasonable expectations of privacy.  In theory, the powerful and affluent, who are 
affected along with the disadvantaged, can protect the individual’s interest in privacy 
through the political process, preventing legislative overreach.  See William J. Stuntz, Pri-
vacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1944–46 (1995).  In 
practice, however, those most able to exert political influence are unlikely to be aware of 
the scope of modern reporting laws or moved to engage in legislative debate.  In the ab-
sence of transparency about civil reporting laws, the political process seems a weak substi-
tute for constitutional review. 
364 See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (“Whether a search is reasonable 
[under the Fourth Amendment] ‘is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the de-
gree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to 
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’”). 
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The threshold question in both lines of cases is what counts as a 
reasonable expectation of privacy that society is or should be pre-
pared to accept as reasonable.  While this phrasing comes from Katz, 
the same substance is used in due process cases.  Fourteenth 
Amendment cases support the idea that there is a legitimate and rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in medical information that can be 
protected from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amend-
ment.  There is nothing wrong with having two or more constitution-
al amendments that apply to a concept of privacy.  The First Amend-
ment can apply to issues of privacy without academic or judicial 
objection that it conflicts with the application of the Fourth Amend-
ment, for example.  Therefore, there should be no impediment to 
recognizing a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy in identifia-
ble health information within the meaning of several Amendments. 
One possible difference between Fourth Amendment and due 
process analysis is the characterization of a justifiable government 
reason for obtaining personal information.  Is a legitimate purpose 
enough or must government offer a more important state interest?  
Must the need for data to achieve that purpose be merely plausible or 
based on empirical evidence?  Here, there may be differences.  Spe-
cial needs cases like Ferguson indicate that the government cannot jus-
tify a search for law enforcement purposes, even if the long-term 
purpose might be a civil benefit to society.  Cases like Whalen and 
Earls suggest that government can compel information for a legiti-
mate purpose, even if the information is not actually necessary to 
achieve that purpose. 
The question for both Fourth Amendment and due process pur-
poses is whether the government is justified in compelling identifia-
ble health information about individuals.  The human rights frame-
work offers principles for refining the doctrine.  Specifically, the 
principles of necessity and proportionality suggest that the state’s in-
terest be stated in specific terms, not speculative generalities, and that 
interest must be “in the interests of society as understood under the 
Covenant.”365  Moreover, the more sensitive the information at issue, 
the more justification the state needs to obtain it without consent.  
Applying the Fourth Amendment would mean that the information 
warrants protection even in the hands of third parties. 
Human rights principles also call for effective remedies for viola-
tions.366  A Fourth Amendment remedy lies in the exclusionary rule, 
 
365 Human Rights Committee, supra note 20, at para. 7. 
366 Id. at para. 11. 
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which may be sufficient in criminal cases.  If the government cannot 
use the tainted fruit as evidence, a criminal defendant is not harmed, 
at least in theory.  The exclusionary rule has limited practical applica-
tion in the absence of a criminal prosecution.367  As in Chandler, the 
often-sought remedy in civil cases is to strike down the law authoriz-
ing the search. 
Using the human rights framework, it should be possible to cate-
gorize reporting laws on the basis of four variables:  (1) the sensitivity 
or expectation of privacy in the health information; (3) the degree of 
importance of the government function at issue; (4) the magnitude 
of the need for government to obtain the information to achieve that 
government function; and (4) the need for individually identifiable 
data to achieve that government function.  As noted above, health in-
formation should qualify as sensitive for purposes of the first variable.  
Most people have a reasonable expectation that their health infor-
mation will not be used beyond their health care without their con-
sent.  Yet that expectation can be overcome for sufficient government 
purposes. 
The second variable focuses on the function that government is 
performing, rather than a general purpose for collecting the data. 
This slight shift in terminology from purpose to function is intended 
to ensure specificity in the statement of a state’s interest, which will 
allow meaningful assessment of its importance.  Moreover, it requires 
all uses of the data to be for a government function.  If a government 
agency expects to provide the data it collects to a third party, that 
third party must also perform a government function.  This would 
preclude some disclosures to private researchers, but would permit 
providing relevant data to other government agencies in many cases. 
The third variable connects the data to the specific government 
function by requiring that the data are needed to carry out a gov-
ernment function.  This allows government to require the collection 
of even sensitive data when they are truly necessary to an important 
purpose of government.  The last variable is a reminder that it is 
identifiable information that raises privacy concerns.  To the extent 
that identifiable data are not necessary, personal identifiers would 
not be justified. 
 
367 But see LAFAVE, supra note 102, § 1.7(c) (describing how exclusionary rule might apply in 
civil commitment proceedings); id. § 1.7(f) (describing the applicability of exclusionary 
rule in various administrative proceedings). 
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Different health reporting laws seek different types of health in-
formation for different reasons.368  Thus, the variables may carry dif-
ferent weights in different laws.  See Table 1 below for an example of 
how reporting laws might be characterized along these parameters. 
Using this rubric, mandatory reporting of universal life events that 
trigger rights and responsibilities of citizenship rank high.  These in-
clude reports of births, marriages, divorces, and deaths.  No one 
would dispute the government’s function in these circumstances or 
its need to identify an individual with these events.  Compelled re-
porting by hospitals and other agencies should qualify as a civil 
search that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment without con-
sent and without probable cause.  The rationale is not that the rec-
ords are produced or held by third parties, but that the government 
has a legitimate need for identifiable data to carry out an important 
government function. 
Laws requiring the reporting of instances of abuse or neglect of 
children and vulnerable elderly persons should also rank high, be-
cause of the immediacy of the harm and the probability of continued 
risks to personal safety.  Government agencies are properly charged 
with protecting persons unable to protect themselves, and the identi-
ty of wrongdoers is necessary to carry out that function. 
Mandatory reporting of contagious diseases and exposure to toxic 
substances should also rank high.  However, more nuance is needed 
here.  It is certainly important for public health officials to identify 
the source of a dangerous, contagious disease that is spreading in an 
area or likely to spread very soon.  As noted in Part II, instances of 
disease outbreaks or emerging epidemics are relatively rare, while the 
list of reportable diseases and conditions is quite long.  Today, 
notifiable diseases must be reported even when the disease poses no 
immediate threat to anyone but the patient.369  The reports are used 
to compile statistics on the incidence and prevalence of diseases and 
to conduct research on such questions as risk factors for disease.  Sta-
tistical uses, while important, do not necessarily require identifiable 
data and may be vulnerable to challenge. 
Like notifiable disease reporting laws, contemporary newborn 
screening laws apply to two categories of conditions.  The state has an 
interest in ensuring that treatable conditions that threaten a new-
born’s ability to function normally be recognized and brought to the 
family’s attention as soon as possible.  However, screening for other 
 
368 See supra text accompanying note 85. 
369 See supra text accompanying notes 71–81. 
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genetic anomalies only produces samples for DNA databanks that are 
used for research.  Research on how to prevent or treat such condi-
tions is surely important, but it is not an important function for gov-
ernment.  As Congress has recognized, such data collection for re-
search requires parental consent.370 
Reports of cases of chronic conditions are also primarily used for 
research.  They were originally created by hospitals to monitor the 
quality of care provided by the physicians and others who practiced in 
that hospital.371  No one would question that use by caregivers.  It is 
the required collection by government that threatens the legitimacy 
of such registries.  Thus, submission of identifiable data to cancer 
registries may require individual consent. 
It may be justifiable for states to require the creation of registries 
for uses restricted to non-government entities, such as “information 
fiduciaries” like health providers.  Thus, states might require hospi-
tals to establish cancer registries for the purpose of encouraging hos-
pitals to monitor the quality of care, without requiring any further 
reporting to the state, as part of the government functions of licens-
ing hospitals and ensuring they provide safe and effective care.  Gov-
ernment could also require the establishment of PDMPs with access 
restricted to physicians and pharmacists, as some are today.  But 
opening such databases to public or private research changes the 
purpose of collecting the data, removes it from a government func-
tion, and undermines its justification.  Allowing law enforcement ac-
cess without a warrant or probable cause comes very close to what Fer-
guson forbids. 
The same might be true for immunization registries, which can 
help both physicians and patients track what immunizations patients 
have received and when additional doses should be administered.  
States may have an interest in monitoring whether children have re-
ceived immunizations required by separate laws that are justified as a 
means of protecting the public from the spread of contagious diseas-
 
370 See supra text accompanying note 79. 
371 Cancer registries are the classic example, with a documented history as far back as the 
late 18th Century.  See RODOLFO SARACCI & CHRISTOPHER P. WILD, INTERNATIONAL 
AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER: THE FIRST 50 YEARS, 1965–2015, at 106 (2015), 
http://www.iarc.fr/en/publications/books/iarc50/IARC_50%20years.pdf.  Data collec-
tion on the incidence and treatment of different cancers was not encouraged by govern-
ments until the early 20th Century with Connecticut and New York State leading the way 
in the United States in the 1940s.  Id. at 107; see also State Cancer Registry Laws and Require-
ments, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF DERMATOLOGY (Dec. 2012), https://www.aad.org/
file%20library/global%20navigation/education%20and%20quality%20care/state%20ca
ncer%20registries/state-cancer-registries-laws-and-requirements.pdf. 
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es.372  Since states typically delegate enforcement of immunization 
laws to schools by making such immunizations a condition for attend-
ing school or daycare, it is less clear that other government agencies 
need or should have access to such registry data without consent. 
Many health information registries serve as a repository of data for 
research.  A controversial example is New York City’s blood sugar reg-
istry.373  The City’s health department argues that individual consent 
should not be needed because that would “compromise the data 
analyses that are used to assess the burden of disease, evaluate the 
impact of interventions, and responsibly allocate government re-
sources.”374  Such arguments logically could apply to a wide range of 
personal information sought for research. 
Some scholars argue that patients should not be allowed to ex-
clude their health information from research databases that are made 
available to multiple public and private users.375  The standard argu-
ments for dispensing with consent to research are:  (1) the study 
sample will not be representative of the population as a whole unless 
everyone is included; and (2) obtaining consent is administratively 
burdensome and adds costs to the research enterprise.376  The first 
argument has always been questionable, if not pretexual.  Well-
designed research rarely requires information from everyone in a 
population (either of the country or of those with a particular disease 
or exposure).377 
The second argument, although couched in empirical terms, im-
plies a normative claim: it may be difficult for researchers to obtain 
consent, so the data should be provided without patient consent.  
Obtaining consent to any type of research (or anything at all) always 
includes some administrative effort and cost, just as any other aspect 
of conducting research incurs costs and administrative inconven-
 
372 See Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 177 (1922) (upholding mandatory immunization against 
smallpox as a condition of school attendance). 
373 See supra text accompanying notes 80–81. 
374 Chamany et al., supra note 82, at 559. 
375 See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 1, at 143. 
376 See id. at 120 (noting that requiring consent would render many research projects cost-
prohibitive); IOM RESEARCH, supra note 87, at 209–12 (noting that, in some cases, seek-
ing individuals’ consent contributes to selection bias); see also Lawrence O. Gostin & 
James G. Hodge, Personal Privacy and Common Goods:  A Framework for Balancing Under the 
National Health Information Privacy Rule, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1451–52 (2002) (arguing 
that consent would hinder comprehensive data collection and add expense). 
377 See Mark A. Rothstein & Abigail B. Shoben, Does Consent Bias Research?, 13(4) AM. J. 
BIOETHICS 27, 31–32 (2013). 
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ience.378  So the second argument is really a normative claim that au-
tonomy is a lesser value than minimizing cost and inconvenience.  If 
accepted, such a claim would dispense with respect for autonomy and 
privacy in all circumstances involving money and effort—which 
means virtually all circumstances. 
“Privacy comes at a cost,” Chief Justice Roberts said in Riley.379  
When government seeks something from an individual, the Constitu-
tion requires it to pay the cost, whether by obtaining consent or 
providing a sufficient justification for not doing so.  Convenience is 
not a sufficient justification.  Like privacy, autonomy comes at a cost.  
Yet no one would claim that cost should always override autonomy.  
Such a principle would eviscerate such aspects of autonomy as the 
right to refuse treatment or to participate in research.380  Absent spe-
cial circumstances, researchers should not be able to use, for their 
own research, personally identifiable information collected by a gov-
ernment agency, without the informed consent of the individuals in-
volved, because they would need informed consent in the absence of 
the database.  The database gives them “an effort-free tool” for their 
research.381 
The New York City health department made an additional argu-
ment to support its blood sugar registry.  It said that even if some 
people do not want to be reported and do not need services, others 
do, so the possibility that some might benefit should override the ob-
jection of the first, perhaps larger, group.382  This is simply an argu-
ment for majority rule, which the Constitution is supposed to con-
strain.  Supporters of the Registry conclude generally that “helping 
vulnerable people monitor their health status and take measures to 
reduce risk is well within the government’s power.”383  Offering ser-
vices is certainly within the government’s power and should be en-
couraged.  But the reporting ordinance does not offer services; it only 
compels the reporting of information.  If one accepts the idea that a 
 
378 See, e.g., Pierce Cnty. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 146 (2003) (refusing to interpret a federal 
statute to permit data collected for one purpose to be used for different purposes—as an 
“effort-free tool”—without complying with any legal prerequisites that would exist in the 
absence of the database). 
379 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014). 
380 Mariner, supra note 73, at 394. 
381 Guillen, 537 U.S. at 146. 
382 Chamany et al., supra note 82, at 559. 
383 Michelle M. Mello & Lawrence O. Gostin, Commentary:  A Legal Perspective on Diabetes Sur-
veillance—Privacy and the Police Power, 87 THE MILBANK QTRLY. 575, 576 (2009); see also id. 
at 577 (asserting that “the state has a compelling interest in controlling the staggering 
human, social, and economic burdens of diabetes”). 
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state can obtain personally identifiable health information without 
the person’s consent whenever it might help an agency to offer ser-
vices, study a disease, plan budgets, or reduce costs, then there really 
is no limit to the power to compel personal information of any sort.384 
The most credible arguments for the power to obtain identifiable 
information for research without consent are still grounded in two 
empirical requirements, instead of normative principles.  The first is 
an assurance that the study poses no risks of physical or mental harm.  
Unlike research procedures that interact with the person herself, data 
collection and analysis do not intrude on the body.385  To be sure, the 
revelation of damaging information about a person may cause the 
person emotional distress or provoke discriminatory actions against 
the person.  Thus, requirements for security and confidentiality are 
essential: keeping the information secure against revelation outside 
the research study itself; and ensuring that research results are re-
ported without identifiers and in a manner that prevents attribution 
to any individual.  These are necessary elements of responsible re-
search studies that promise confidentiality.  Whether they are suffi-
cient to convince enough people to accept laws authorizing the use of 
their identifiable information for research is unclear.  There may be 
concern that databases are vulnerable to breach,386 despite research-
ers’ efforts to provide security, or that information is becoming easier 
to re-identify.387  A rigorous survey by Harris Interactive and Alan 
Westin for the Institute of Medicine found a wide array of public 
opinions.388  Only 1% of respondents were willing to allow researchers 
 
384 See Mariner, supra note 81, at 149–50.  The Registry ordinance was not challenged, but it 
might be vulnerable to challenge.  The Board of Health relied on the same law to author-
ize the Registry as it did to adopt the Portion Cap Rule (a.k.a. Big Gulp).  The Portion 
Cap Rule was struck down on the ground that the Board of Health did not have the legis-
lative authority to issue the ordinance.  See New York Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Cham-
bers of Commerce v. New York City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 23 N.Y.3d 681, 
701 (N.Y. 2014). 
385 See IOM RESEARCH, supra note 87, at 91–92. 
386 See Charles Ornstein & Annie Waldman, CVS Among Hundreds of Providers Violating HIPAA, 
Review Finds, THE BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 29, 2015), https:/ /www.bostonglobe.com/2015/
12/29/cvs-veterans-affairs-violate-federal-privacy-laws-review-finds/
HPddb5xkuRwiYETmgZKQLN/story.html; Damian Paletta, Breached Network’s Security Is 
Criticized, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2015, at A1 (describing problems with federal Office of 
Personnel Management’s security system, which permitted breach). 
387 See Big Data:  Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES 54 (May 2014), www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf (“Another reality of big data is that once data is 
collected, it can be very difficult to keep anonymous.”). 
388 Alan F. Westin, How the Public Views Privacy and Health Research, 20–22 (March 2008), 
http://www.iom.edu/Object.File/Master/48/528/%20Westin%20IOM%20Srvy%20Rept
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to use their personal information without their consent, while 8% 
were willing to give a general consent to such use.389  Thirty-eight per-
cent wanted the right to consent to or refuse each use, while 13% 
would not allow research use under any circumstances.390 
Most supporters of eliminating consent to health records research 
assume that such research will bring a new treatment discoveries and 
significant medical and social benefits.  If history offers any lessons, 
this seems a bit optimistic.391  Here again, the expected benefits re-
main speculative and in the future, while erosions of principles of in-
dividual autonomy, privacy, and dignity may be immediate.  Others 
may assume that de-identified data will be sufficient for most re-
search.392  This is also unlikely.393  Investigators prefer data with per-
sonal identifiers for many reasons, including comparing individual 
results across databases and contacting the individuals for follow-
up.394 
APCDs are a good example of research databases that use individ-
ual level data.395  It would be almost impossible to track health care 
costs and outcomes without being able to attribute those costs and 
outcomes to individual patients and physicians.  Codes might be sub-
 
%2011-1107.pdf; see also Scott Hensley, Poll:  Most Americans Would Share Health Data for Re-
search, SHOTS—HEALTH NEWS FROM NPR (Jan. 9, 2015, 10:30 AM), http: //www.npr.org/
sections/health-shots/2015/01/09/375621393/poll-most-americans-would-share-health-
data-for-research (reporting the results of a November 2014 poll showing a decline to 
53% [from 68% in an August 2014 poll] of respondents who were in favor of sharing 
even data that has no identifying information, while 47% would refuse to share even 
anonymous health data). 
389 Westin, supra note 388, at 21. 
390 Id. at 22. 
391 See, e.g., Nicolas P. Terry, Information Technology’s Failure to Disrupt Healthcare, 13 NEV. L.J. 
722, 748–49 (2013) (discussing big data’s failure to produce significant improvements in 
health care using Google Health as an example); John P. A. Ioannidis, Why Most Published 
Research Findings Are False, 2 PLOS MED. 696, 699–701 (Aug. 2005), 
www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124 (finding that ini-
tial studies reporting success are typically followed by later studies that fail to replicate the 
original study’s findings, and suggesting reasons for this conclusion). 
392 See, e.g., Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 1, at 128. 
393 See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy:  Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymizaton, 
57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1716 (2010); Mark A. Rothstein, Is Deidentification Sufficient to Pro-
tect Health Privacy in Research?, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 9 (2010). 
394 See, e.g., Frakt & Bagley, supra note 46, at 1880 (asserting that the identifiable data in Med-
icare claims are an “essential variable” for research, and “elaborate consent requirements 
make it difficult or impossible to share patient data related to substance-use disorders”). 
395 APCDs also face a claim that ERISA preempts the application of state laws requiring self-
insured employee health insurance plans and their third party administrators to submit 
claims data to the state APCD.  See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Donegan, 746 F.3d 497, 508 
(2d Cir. 2014) (finding ERISA preempts statute’s application to ERISA plans), cert. granted 
sub nom. Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015). 
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stituted for patient names, but many other identifying details are 
needed to draw meaningful conclusions.  Given the pressing need for 
controlling health care costs, it is certainly important to identify the 
most cost-effective ways to provide good care.  Government agencies 
at the state and federal level have a legitimate interest in conducting 
research to do so.  But the question of principle intrudes again.  The 
performance of some ordinary government functions includes studies 
of this sort.  How might demands for individually identifiable infor-
mation for research be distinguished from demands for any other 
government function?  In the absence of a satisfactory distinction, 
laws requiring third party submission of identifiable data may be vul-
nerable to challenge. 
CONCLUSION 
As Justice Marshall wrote, the proper question is what risks people 
“should be forced to assume in a free and open society.”396  Should 
people assume the risks associated with government demands for 
their information, or should the Constitution place limits on those 
demands?  Traditionally, both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
have been interpreted as placing almost all the risk on individuals.  
However, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Jones, Riley, and Patel have 
inspired hope among scholars who argue that the Fourth Amend-
ment should be a more robust source of information privacy protec-
tion.  Moreover, international reaction to surveillance is encouraging 
more attention to enforcing the human right of privacy.397 
Although this shift in outlook has focused on criminal investiga-
tions, it has implications for protecting privacy in the civil sphere.  It 
may inspire challenges to a number of civil laws requiring health pro-
viders and insurers to report identifiable health information to the 
state.  While the value of many such laws are beyond question, the ra-
tionale for their enactment no longer reflects either the specific pur-
poses they serve in contemporary America or a coherent concept of 
 
396 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
397 See OHCHR, Right to Privacy, supra note 14, at 4–5 (discussing the right to privacy in the 
context of governmental digital surveillance  in the 2014 report of the Office of the Unit-
ed Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights); Owen Bowcott, UK-US Surveillance 
Regime was Unlawful ‘For Seven Years’, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2015, 5:10 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/feb/06/gchq-mass-internet-surveillance-
unlawful-court-nsa (reporting that Great Britain’s Investigatory Powers Tribunal found 
that regulations governing Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters’ access 
to phone and email records intercepted by NSA violated Article 8 or 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights). 
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privacy of medical information.  A more nuanced approach to doc-
trine is in order, one that recognizes the reasonableness of expecta-
tions of privacy in health information and demands specific justifica-
tion for compelling its disclosure to government in accordance with 
the principles governing the human right of privacy.  This approach 
should distinguish important mandatory reporting laws from fishing 
expeditions, allow essential data collection, and preserve constitu-
tional protection for essential aspects of privacy. 
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TABLE 1: REPORTING LAW CHARACTERISTICS 
 SENSITIVITY OF 
HEALTH 
INFORMATION 
IMPORTANCE OF 
GOVERNMENT 
FUNCTION 
MAGNITUDE OF 
GOV’T NEED FOR 
INFORMATION 
GOV’T NEED FOR 
IDENTIFIABLE 
INFORMATION 
Life events (birth, 
death) 
N H H H 
Abuse (children, 
elderly) 
M H H H 
Serious contagious 
disease/toxic ex-
posure 
H H H H 
Treatable newborn 
genetic condition 
H M M H 
Controlled sub-
stances prescrip-
tion registry 
(PDMP) 
H L M M 
Contagious disease 
data collection 
H L M N 
Chronic diseases 
and conditions 
H L M N 
Cancer registry 
 
H L L N 
Immunization reg-
istry 
L M L N 
Newborn anoma-
lies research 
H N N N 
Insurance claims 
research on treat-
ment costs 
H L M M 
Insurance claims 
research on treat-
ment quality 
H L N M 
H = High sensitivity; high importance; high need 
M = Moderate sensitivity; moderate importance; moderate need 
L = Low sensitivity; low importance; low need 
N = NO sensitivity; no importance 
 
